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WHAT’S NEW ABOUT THE NEW NORMAL:
THE EVOLVING MARKET FOR NEW LAWYERS
IN THE 21ST CENTURY
BERNARD A. BURK *
ABSTRACT
Everyone agrees that job prospects for many new law graduates have been poor for the
last several years; there is rather less consensus on whether, when, how, or why that may
change as the economy recovers from the Great Recession. This Article analyzes historical
and current trends in the job market for new lawyers in an effort to predict how that market
may evolve.
The Article derives quantitative measurements of the proportion of law graduates over
the last thirty years who have obtained initial employment for which law school serves as
rational substantive preparation (“Law Jobs”). In comparing entry-level hiring patterns
since 2008 with those in earlier periods, a significant development emerges: While other
sectors of the market for new lawyers have changed only modestly during the Great Recession, one sector—the larger private law firms colloquially known as “BigLaw”—has contracted proportionally six times as much as all the others. Entering BigLaw classes overall
are now roughly one-third smaller than they were seven years ago. And though BigLaw
hiring has historically accounted for only 10% to 20% of each graduating class, it is responsible for over half the entry-level Law Jobs lost since 2008.
While some observers predict a return to business as usual as the economy recovers, this
Article is skeptical of that account. The Article identifies significant structural changes in
the way that the services BigLaw has traditionally provided are being produced, staffed,
and priced that diminish BigLaw’s need for junior lawyers, both immediately and in the
longer term. These observations suggest that entry-level BigLaw hiring, and thus the market
for new lawyers overall, will remain depressed below pre-recession levels well after demand
improves to or beyond pre-recession levels. At the same time, even though entry-level demand may remain static, new lawyers’ job prospects may nevertheless improve as the contraction in the legal academy now underway reduces the number of new graduates competing for work.
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................
II. DATA AND METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF
ENTRY-LEVEL PLACEMENT OUTCOMES.............................................................
A. The Value and Limitations of Examining the Entry-Level Legal
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2013 Report on the State of the Legal Market by the
Georgetown Law Center for the Study of the Legal Profession
observed that
it is becoming increasingly apparent that the market for legal services in the United States and throughout the world has changed
in fundamental ways and that, even as we work our way out of the
economic doldrums, the practice of law going forward is likely to be
starkly different than in the pre-2008 period. 1
1. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AT THE GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW
CTR. & THOMSON REUTERS PEER MONITOR, 2013 REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE LEGAL
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While scattered commentators still cling to the hope that this is
somehow just a transient bad dream,2 many in the legal profession
and the legal academy have begun to accustom themselves to a dark
and depressing “New Normal.” 3
The author was one of the earlier predictors of this New Normal,4
and while this Article will not indulge any grim satisfaction on that
score, neither will it suggest any reason to foresee a return to the familiar. Rather, it will attempt to identify the most salient features of
the current market for entry-level (that is, more or less immediately
post-graduate) legal employment, and then inquire how new the New
Normal actually is, just what is new about it, and how normal we
may expect it to be. Insights into those questions should help all of
us—students, educators, and practitioners—make better guesses
about what the future holds and develop more effective coping strategies for the longer haul.
Part II presents the Article’s data and methods. It begins by exploring the potential value and limitations of examining the entrylevel legal employment market. It then proposes a qualitative definition of entry-level placements for which law school serves as rational
MARKET 1 (2013), available at https://www.law.georgetown.edu/continuing-legaleducation/executive-education/upload/2013-report.pdf [hereinafter 2013 REPORT ON THE
STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET].
2. For example, one law school dean unapologetically insisted in a late 2012 New
York Times op-ed, in the face of widespread unemployment and underemployment among
recent law graduates, that “Law School Is Worth the Money.” Lawrence E. Mitchell, OpEd., Law School Is Worth the Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/11/29/opinion/law-school-is-worth-the-money.html?smid=pl-share. Despite his arguments’ well-deserved criticism in the media, some law school administrators persist in
advancing similar ones. See Elie Mystal, Law Professor Defends Law Schools; Blames Media, Students, Advisors, Everybody But Himself, ABOVE THE L. (July 26, 2013, 5:33 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/law-professor-defends-law-schools-blames-media-studentsadvisors-everybody-but-himself/#more-260381 (associate dean asserting, for example, that
his law school currently has a “96% employment rate” without mentioning that close to a
third of that 96% was short-term, part-time, clerical, menial, or otherwise not legal practice
or law-related work). Other academics argue that the current downturn in legal hiring is
predominantly cyclical, less serious than is widely believed, and already ending. See, e.g., D.
Benjamin Barros, Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom on the Legal Job Market (Widener Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-60, 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258806; Stephen F. Diamond, Recent Law School Grad Job Rate Ticks Up Sharply, STEPHEN F. DIAMOND (May 6,
2013), http://stephen-diamond.com/?p=4784.
3. William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorksy, Paradigm Shift, 97 A.B.A. J. 40, 40
(2011) (“The legal profession is undergoing a massive structural shift . . . .”); Peter Lattman,
Mass Layoffs at a Top-Flight Law Firm, DEALBOOK – N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2013, 9:39 AM),
http://nyti.ms/1f1VHd3 (The executive partner of Weil Gotshal called June 2013 associate
and staff layoffs and partner pay cuts “essential . . . to enable our firm to continue to excel
and retain its historic profitability in the new normal.”); see 2013 REPORT ON THE STATE OF
THE LEGAL MARKET, supra note 1, at 2.
4. Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 93-102.
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substantive preparation: employment that someone would, ex ante,
rationally plan to attend law school to obtain. This means as a practical matter that either the postgraduate position must require the degree as a condition of employment, or that the course of study provides dramatic and substantial advantages (as opposed to being
merely relevant or useful) in obtaining or performing the job that are
not more easily obtainable or substitutable (whether in nature or extent) another way. Such placements are referred to as “Law Jobs.”
Next, Part II describes the dataset that will be used to measure the
proportion of new graduates who have obtained Law Jobs over time—
the placement data accumulated by the National Association for Law
Placement (“NALP”) and the American Bar Association Section of
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar (“ABA”)—and explores the
data’s strengths and weaknesses for these purposes. The Article then
uses this data to derive a quantitative measurement of the proportion
of those graduates over the last thirty years who have obtained Law
Jobs within roughly nine months of graduation.
After considering the effects of an initially high level of nonreporting that gradually decreased by the mid- to late 1990s, Part III uses
that measure to describe the development of the entry-level Law-Job
market from the 1980s to the present, and considers whether there is
anything significantly different about that market in recent years. It
concludes that there are in fact new differences, and that these differences have most pointedly emerged in the last six years, contemporaneously with the Great Recession, though their origins appear to
be somewhat older. Specifically, the mid-2000s saw a period in which
the entry-level Law-Job market was able to absorb a greater portion
of new graduates than at any other time since detailed data has been
gathered, followed by a precipitous contraction in that market beginning in 2008 and resulting in historically low proportions of Law-Job
placement. Neither of these conclusions should be particularly controversial, though not all observers currently agree.
Part IV then explores just what is new and different. There is surprisingly little commentary on whether or how current circumstances
have affected different sectors of the market for new lawyers differently. Comparison reveals that while most sectors of the entry-level
legal employment market have changed only modestly during the
Great Recession, one sector—the larger private law firms colloquially
known as “BigLaw”—has contracted proportionally six times as much
as all the others. Though this sector has historically hired only 10%
to 20% of each graduating class, it is responsible for over half the entry-level Law Jobs lost since 2008. And because BigLaw historically
has hired a disproportionate number of the candidates most attractive to most employers, this contraction has sent a new cohort of
highly accomplished and credentialed law graduates previously ab-
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sorbed by BigLaw into the competition for non-BigLaw jobs, disrupting common understandings regarding where new graduates with
particular ranges of credentials could expect to find work. These findings suggest that the changes in and to BigLaw are driving the
changes in the entry-level Law Jobs market more generally.
Part V then addresses the question how normal we can expect this
New Normal to be—in other words, how much of what is new is driven by the transient and cyclical features of the Great Recession and
its effect on the demand for legal services, and how much is driven by
structural changes in the manner in which legal services are produced, staffed, and priced. It identifies several technological, competitive, and economic developments that have generated structural
changes in the way that the services traditionally provided predominantly by BigLaw are being produced. All of these developments
seem likely to diminish BigLaw’s need for junior lawyers, both immediately and in the longer term. These developments were gathering force during the 2000s, but emerged in high relief as a result of
the stresses imposed on BigLaw firms and their clients as the economy descended into the Great Recession during 2008. The arguments
that the current contraction in the entry-level Law-Job market is
predominantly caused by cyclical economic phenomena do not address any of the structural factors the Article identifies, whether to
argue that they don’t exist or that they don’t matter. This doesn’t
necessarily mean that the structural argument is right, but it does
mean that if it is wrong, no one has suggested how or why. After surveying BigLaw’s own assessment of these structural factors, Part V
offers the prediction that entry-level BigLaw hiring, and thus the
market for new lawyers overall, will remain depressed below
pre-recession levels well after demand recovers, and will lag substantially behind the pace and extent of any increase in demand for
BigLaw’s services.
Finally, Part VI points out that, given that America’s law schools
produce the graduates seeking to enter the legal labor market, the
prediction that the market for new lawyers will be constricted well
beyond any recovery from the current recession has important implications for the future of the legal academy. The reduced demand for
entry-level Law Jobs has already precipitated a rapid fall in the
number of students considering law degrees and the beginnings of
price competition among some law schools for potential matriculants.
At the same time, a meaningful contraction in the legal academy
could ironically improve future graduates’ job prospects even in a
weak job market by reducing the number of new lawyers chasing
even a persistently limited number of Law Jobs. Noting that the factors promoting a correction in the market for legal education are not
affecting all institutions uniformly, the Article concludes by raising a
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number of questions for further study regarding which factors will
most strongly affect which kinds of institutions, and how the affected
institutions may react.
II. DATA AND METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MEASURES
OF ENTRY-LEVEL PLACEMENT OUTCOMES
A. The Value and Limitations of Examining the
Entry-Level Legal Employment Market
One of the most widely observed features of the New Normal is its
shortage of suitable employment outcomes for many new law graduates. 5 This naturally raises questions about how the current entrylevel job market compares with prior years’, and what about it may
have changed. These questions in turn suggest that an analysis of
entry-level employment outcomes over time may tell us something
useful about past and current employment prospects, and possibly
future ones as well. As a result, such an analysis should be of interest
to law students, law graduates, and legal employers contemplating
their needs and opportunities, as well as those considering attending
law school and the law schools vying for prospective students’ attention. Such an inquiry appears not only interesting, but possible:
There is a fairly substantial body of potentially suitable information,
specifically the data on entry-level law placement that NALP has
gathered and published since the 1970s.
It is also important to note at the outset the limitations of this approach. To begin with, the study’s limited scope creates a limited field
of view: Focusing on entry-level employment truncates the inquiry
more or less at the first job a graduate obtains out of law school. Such
a focus may tell us little about the course lawyers’ career paths may
follow as they advance from there, and thus will not be as informative as we might like about the state or evolution of the legal employment market overall.
In addition, even this limited inquiry is difficult on its own terms
for at least three reasons: First, it is deceptively difficult to formulate
a meaningful qualitative definition of the postgraduate employment
results whose consistent tracking will result in usefully descriptive or
5. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES (July
15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-for-lawschools.html?smid=pl-share; Mark Hansen, Job Market for Would-Be Lawyers Is Even
Bleaker than It Looks, Analysis Says, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2013, 2:14 PM CDT),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/job_market_for_would-be_lawyers_is_bleaker_
than_it_looks_analysis_says/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=
weekly_email; Elie Mystal, NALP13: Entry Level Associates Need Not Apply, ABOVE THE L.
(Apr. 26, 2013, 10:13 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/04/nalp13-entry-level-associatesneed-not-apply/.

2014]

THE NEW NORMAL

547

predictive information. Second, it is even more difficult to map any
collected or easily collectable quantitative data onto any sensible
qualitative definition. And third, the data that are currently available, while superficially plentiful, lack a number of important and
consistently applied distinctions essential to the best-informed analysis, especially the analysis over time that is of special concern here.
All of these concerns necessitate a discussion at the outset on how
to define and measure the entry-level employment outcomes we are
looking for and the data we have to do it.
B. A Qualitative Sketch of the “Law Jobs” This Article Tracks
This Article focuses on the utility of law school as substantive
preparation for employment. This criterion can be elaborated loosely
as selecting those placements that someone would, ex ante, rationally
plan to attend law school to obtain. This should include only placements for which a law degree is typically a necessary or extremely
valuable substantive preparation (as opposed to being merely useful
or relevant); or put slightly differently, the law degree must provide
dramatic and substantial advantages in obtaining or performing the
job not more easily obtainable or substitutable (whether in nature or
extent) another way. 6 Such placements are referred to as “Law Jobs.”
The alert reader will have noticed at least three features of this
definition worthy of note, two distinguished by their absence:
1. The Objective Basis of the Qualitative Standard
First, this definition focuses on the typical—the ordinary rational
person—rather than the unique individual. Anyone can have idiosyncratic reasons for wanting to pursue a law degree and, for that particular person, those reasons (so long as they are not predicated on
any factual misimpression) are of course valid. But unless those reasons would translate to an ordinary rational person stripped of any of
those uniquely individual features, we should not generalize them to
define a Law Job, whose purpose is to help us describe an employment market in which we assume that predominantly ordinary rational people participate.

6. While the qualitative standard articulated in the text is novel and for the reasons
explained below hopefully useful, the author is hardly alone in focusing on the degree of
law-relatedness of a graduate’s first job as a measure of law school’s utility. See, e.g.,
William Henderson, The Competition Is for Full-Time, Professional Law-Related Jobs,
Part II, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (June 30, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhite
board/2013/06/the-competition-is-for-full-time-law-related-professional-jobs-part-ii.html
(“The new gold standard employment outcome is full-time, long-term professional lawrelated jobs.”).

548

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:541

2. The Absence of Any Hedonic Component
Second, by concentrating on employment for which law school is
substantively a necessary or exceptionally valuable preparation, any
hedonic component is eliminated. In other words, this study is not
about “good” jobs versus “bad” ones, or satisfying, exciting, or fulfilling jobs versus work that might lack those characteristics for some
or many of us.
There are several reasons for this omission. Hedonic elements are
often dependent on circumstances extraneous to the work itself, such
as the temperament of an immediate supervisor. And while a study
of law graduates’ job satisfaction early in their careers and how it
may have changed over time would be fascinating, the available data
is unfortunately very limited.7 And in all events, it is only peripherally relevant to the task this Article has in mind: Some conventionally
successful law graduates find that they dislike the most lucrative or
otherwise sought-after law jobs they have managed to obtain. Depending on the place in their hierarchy of priorities the money or
prestige that originally attracted them holds, some who don’t love the
work leave; some stay on anyway. More generally, many lawyers in
all walks of legal life find they don’t love their jobs, but that doesn’t
mean that they’re not Law Jobs of the kind that law school prepares
them for and makes accessible to them. After all, most people who
need to work for a living don’t love their jobs. 8 As the old saw goes,
that’s why they call it work. 9
7. William Henderson and David Zaring conducted an intriguing study about what
tends to make large-firm associates like or dislike their jobs, but it concentrates on only a
portion of the entry-level or near entry-level employment market, and portrays only one
moment in time. William D. Henderson & David Zaring, Young Associates in Trouble, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1087 (2007) (book review). Other commentators dating somewhat further
back have argued—not without real anecdotal and other support—that many large-firm
associates do or should dislike their jobs. These too are limited in time and scope. See, e.g.,
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address, The Legal Profession Today, 62
IND. L.J. 151, 151-54 (1987) (calling the work “drudgery”); Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics
in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 725-26 (1998) (calling the work “numbingly dull”).
8. See GALLUP, STATE OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE: EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT INSIGHTS FOR U.S. BUSINESS LEADERS 4, 12 (2013), available at http://www.gallup.com/
strategicconsulting/163007/state-american-workplace.aspx (stating “that 70% of American
workers are ‘not engaged’ or ‘actively disengaged’ ” at work); Susan Adams, New Survey:
Majority of Employees Dissatisfied, FORBES (May 18, 2012, 12:28 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2012/05/18/new-survey-majority-of-employeesdissatisfied/ (reporting that 65% of American workers are “somewhat unsatisfied” or “unsatisfied” with their jobs); Oliver Burkeman, Op-Ed., Who Goes to Work to Have Fun?, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/opinion/burkeman-are-wehaving-fun-yet.html?_r=0; Patricia Reaney, Dream Job? Most U.S. Workers Want to
Change Careers – Poll, REUTERS (July 1, 2013, 4:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/07/01/us-usa-work-idUSBRE96015Z20130701.
9. This is not to suggest that those who imagine they would dislike doing any of the
many things that lawyers do should go to law school anyway. But the failure presented
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3. The Absence of Any Explicit Economic Component
Third, the definition of Law Jobs lacks any explicitly economic
component. This omission is likely controversial. Much attention has
appropriately been paid recently to the rapid run-up in the cost of a
law degree over the last decade and the lasting and intractable constraints and hardships on graduates that these costs can impose.10
And it has been widely remarked how the nondischargeable student
loan debt many law students incur may in and of itself make certain
less remunerative Law Jobs these students might otherwise welcome
seem pragmatically inaccessible. 11 Nor is it unreasonable to argue
that producers and consumers of legal education ought to be focusing
on placement outcomes that allow graduates to pay their bills.12
when a law graduate finds nonlegal work preferable to any work a law degree makes
available is not a placement failure. It is instead a failure of the student to have anticipated, and perhaps of the law school to have helped the student anticipate, that result.
10. See, e.g., Paul Campos, The Tuition Puzzle, LAWYERS, GUNS & MONEY (June
17, 2014), http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2014/06/tuition-puzzle/comment-page1#comment-1170783 ; Jerome M. Organ, Reflections on the Decreasing Affordability of Legal Education, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 33-36 (2013); Michael L. Coyne, ABA and Legal Education: Change Won’t Come from Within, NAT’L L.J. (May 8, 2013),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202599229647; William D. Henderson & Rachel M.
Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: How Long Will It Last if Law Grads Can’t Pay Bills?,
A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2012, 5:20 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
the_law_school_bubble_how_long_will_it_last_if_law_grads_cant_pay_bills/; Milan Markovic, Are Law Schools to Blame for the Lack of Access to Legal Services?, LEGAL ETHICS F.
(Apr. 1, 2013, 5:37 PM), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2013/04/are-law-schools-toblame-for-the-lack-of-access-to-legal-services-.html; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Student Debt
and the Crushing of the American Dream, OPINIONATOR – N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2013,
9:09 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/student-debt-and-the-crushingof-the-american-dream/?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130513; Brian Tamanaha,
The Quickly Exploding Law Graduate Debt Disaster, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 24, 2012, 1:00
PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/03/quickly-exploding-law-graduate-debt.html; see also
Coalition of Concerned Colleagues, The Economics of Legal Education: A Concern of
Colleagues, A.B.A. (Mar. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administra
tive/professional_responsibility/taskforcecomments/032013_coalition_revcomment.authchec
kdam.pdf (open letter to the ABA Task Force on Legal Education signed by nearly 70 law
professors).
11. See sources cited supra note 10.
12. There are a number of different ways the economics of entry-level placement can
be evaluated. One is a purely financial analysis, taking into account not only actual income
and expenditures, but such factors as the three years’ income and enhanced earning power
forgone while attending law school, and the likely effect of the law degree on a graduate’s
earning power long-term. An analysis of this kind is provided in Herwig Schlunk, Mamas
Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be . . . Lawyers (Vanderbilt Law Sch., Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 09-29, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1497044; see also
Herwig Schlunk, Mamas 2011: Is a Law Degree a Good Investment Today?, 36 J. LEGAL
PROF. 301 (2011) (updating data and concluding that a substantial majority of law graduates will have made bad investments in their JDs as of graduation day). A detailed econometric labor-market analysis of the financial value of a law degree relative to higher education terminating in a bachelor’s degree may be found in Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree (Harvard Law Sch. Program on the Legal Profession, Research Paper No. 2013-6, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250585 (arguing an “average” net positive value of $1 million over
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There are several reasons why this Article nevertheless elects to
omit an explicitly economic element from the definition of Law Jobs.
To begin with, each law student’s economic needs and preferences are
rooted in that student’s particular objective circumstances and subjective preferences, making the economic feasibility of any particular
position based solely on its pecuniary returns difficult to generalize.
In addition, the cost of a JD is independent of whether or to what extent a graduate needs the degree to get a particular job. Many jobs
viewed as desirable by many law students pay modestly but nevertheless require a law degree. Tuitions may fall and salaries may rise,
but the degree of substantive connection between the law degree and
the job will not be affected by either. And finally, the data available
to assess the economics of a position are limited and do not appear to
be particularly reliable. NALP has been surveying salary information
for many years, but the results are substantially underreported and
likely skewed high by selection bias. 13
This is not, of course, to say that those considering a law degree
should ignore their own economic circumstances or how the cost of
law school may limit their employment or life options down the road.
It is only to say that what they can expect to do with a law degree can
be determined independently from whether they can afford to do it. If
the degree has become too expensive to support what comes afterwards, that is a very serious and very real, but different, problem
that is beyond the scope of this particular Article.
C. A Tour of NALP’s Entry-Level Employment Data
NALP has since the 1970s annually solicited from all ABAaccredited law schools a range of graduate employment data. For
nearly forty consecutive years, this data has been published, with
a lifetime). This Article raises some questions of interest to the instant study and will be
discussed infra Part V.C.1. A somewhat different approach considers new law graduates’
likely monetary needs (such as servicing student loan debt) and aspirations (such as supporting a family or owning a home), and posits a minimum salary necessary to make ends
meet. See, e.g., Jim Chen, A Degree of Practical Wisdom: The Ratio of Educational Debt to
Income as a Basic Measurement of Law School Graduates’ Economic Viability, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1185 (2012) (suggesting a starting salary of at least three times the
graduate’s annual law school tuition); Organ, supra note 10, at 44-49 (using Professor
Chen’s methodology “to reasonably estimate the percentage of [Class of 2011] law graduates who manifest marginal or better financial viability” and finding this number to be 46.5%
of graduates after accounting for scholarships); David Lat, Changes in Legal Education:
Some Thoughts from Dean David Van Zandt, ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 3, 2010, 8:23 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/02/changes-in-legal-education-some-thoughts-from-dean-davidvan-zandt/ (suggesting a “break-even starting salary” of $65,000). All of these approaches
are subject to the concerns discussed in the paragraph following in the text.
13. See, e.g., Gary Rosin, N and Salary Reporting, FAC. LOUNGE (Nov. 22, 2011, 10:03
AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2011/11/n-and-salary-reporting.html; So You Want
to Be a Rock ‘n’ Roll Star?, LAW BY THE NUMBERS (Mar. 3, 2011, 6:24 PM),
http://uberlaw.net/LawNumbers/2011/03/03/so-you-want-to-be-a-rock-n-roll-star/.
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editorial commentary, in NALP’s annual reports, for many years entitled Employment Report and Salary Survey, and since the late
1990s entitled Jobs & JD’s. 14 The nature and extent of the data gathered and published has changed over time and has gradually become
more detailed. It has come to include increasing amounts of information regarding the graduates, the characteristics of their employers and their work, and geographic and salary details. Because it is
the principal dataset used in this Article to portray the developments
in the entry-level legal job market over time, it is worth taking a
moment to describe it.
1. An Overview of the NALP and ABA Datasets
Since 1975, NALP has sought employment information as of
roughly nine months after the last third-year class’s graduation
from all ABA-accredited law schools. This information is reported
in the aggregate, without isolating the results at any particular
law school. 15
Employment status. Graduates for whom employment status is
known are initially categorized as either “Employed” or “Not Working.” “Not Working” is divided (where known) between “Seeking Employment” and “Not Seeking Employment.” Beginning with the Class
of 1983, the number of graduates “Continuing Studies Full-Time” is
broken out where known.
Employer type. “Employed” graduates are initially divided (where
known) among “Sectors” or “Employer Types”: “Academic,” “Business,”
14. E.g., NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, JOBS & JD’S: EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES
OF NEW LAW GRADUATES, CLASS OF 2011 (2012) [hereinafter NALP CLASS OF 2011 REPORT].

There are many instances throughout this Article in which the annual NALP Jobs & JD’s
Reports are discussed; background information regarding these reports may be found
online. See Jobs & JD’s: Employment and Salaries of New Law Graduates, NALP,
http://www.nalp.org/jobsjdsemploymentandsalariesofnewlawgraduates (last visited June
22, 2014) (published annually roughly one year after each graduating class). For clarity’s
sake, when the discussion is about a particular year’s report, that report will be cited as
“NALP CLASS OF ___ REPORT, supra note 14.” When the discussion is about statistics derived from data found within the NALP Jobs & JD’s Reports aggregately, the footnote will
not cite each individual report; the year range of the reports cited can be discerned from
the particular textual discussion.
15. Beginning in 2011 (with respect to the graduating Class of 2010), the ABA Section
of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar began publishing a school-by-school
breakdown of these placement outcomes using the same raw data, focusing principally on
job
and
employer
types.
See
Employment
Summary
Report,
A.B.A.,
http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/ (last visited June 22, 2014). At the
ABA’s insistence, the granularity of this information with respect to short-term, part-time,
and school-funded positions increased significantly in 2012 (for the Class of 2011). See Updated Statement of the ABA’s Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar Regarding Collection of New Job Placement Data, A.B.A. (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissi
ons_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/2012_3_15_updated_statement_regarding
_employment_data.authcheckdam.pdf.
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“Government,” “Judicial Clerkships,” “Public Interest,” and “Law
Firms.” 16 Law Firm employment is broken down by firm size;17 Government employment is broken down by type.18 School-funded positions are not broken out until the Class of 2010 (and in 2010 are divided only between long-term and short-term, but not full-time and
part-time).
Job type. Before 1982, no job types are specified. Beginning with
the Class of 1982, “Employed” graduates are divided among “Legal
Positions,” “Nonlegal,” or “Other Positions” (the term changes during
the 1990s), and “Employed, Job Type Unknown.” 19 Beginning with
the Class of 2001, Job Types are divided (where known) among “Bar
Passage Required,” “JD Preferred,” “Other Professional,” “Other
Nonprofessional,” and “Unknown.” 20
Extent of Employment. Before 1991, NALP provided no information on the number of graduates employed in part-time or shortterm positions. From 1991–2000, NALP reported a percentage of
placements by Employer Type, and a number of placements by Job
Type, that were “Part-Time.” This category was suspended in 2001,
and it was not until the Class of 2009 that the “Employed” category
broke out the jobs reported as “Part-Time” (defined as less than thirty hours per week) and the jobs reported as “Temporary” (defined as
16. From the Class of 1975 through the Class of 1988, these divisions by Sector are
expressed as percentages; beginning with the Class of 1989, they are reported as raw
numbers.
17. For the Class of 1979 through the Class of 1981, numbers of those employed in law
firms are provided (where known) for solos and for firms of 2-10, 11-25, 26-50, and more
than 50 lawyers. For the classes of 1982 through 1989, the numbers of those employed in
law firms are broken out (where known) into solo practitioners, and firms of 2-10, 11-25,
26-50, 51-100 and “Very Large (101+).” Beginning with the Class of 1990, “Very Large
(101+)” is replaced by 101-250, 251-500, and 501+. For the Classes of 1982 through 1985,
1987 through 1988, and 1991 through 2008, the breakdown among law firm sizes is reported by percentage; all other Classes are reported in raw numbers.
18. Beginning with the Class of 1989, “Government” positions are broken out (where
known) into “Defender,” “Military,” “Prosecution,” “Administrative Agency,” and “Other
Government Area.” “Government” positions are also broken out (where known) into “Federal,” “State,” “Local,” and “Other Level” beginning with the Class of 1989.
19. The definitions of these categories are explored infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
20. The definitions of “Bar Passage Required” and “JD Preferred” are explored infra
notes 29-30 and accompanying text. Beginning with the Class of 1995, the data include
percentages of those in various employment categories who are seeking other work. From
the Class of 1995 through the Class of 2000, the percentages of those Seeking Other Employment are broken out (where known) by “Employer Type” (“Academic,” “Business,”
“Government,” “Judicial Clerkships,” “Public Interest,” and “Law Firms”) and “Job Type”
(“Legal” and “Non-Legal”). Beginning with the Class of 1996, percentages of those Seeking
Other Employment are further broken down by size of law firm and type of Government or
Public Interest employment. Beginning with the Class of 2001, the “Job Type” changes to
“Bar Passage Required,” “JD Preferred,” “Other Professional,” and “Other NonProfessional.”
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short-term positions expected to last less than one year), but did not
break out the portion of each that was both Part-Time and Temporary until the ABA released that information in 2011. Beginning with
the Class of 2009, Part-Time and Temporary positions were reported
both as a percentage of the overall number of jobs (of any kind)
obtained by the class, as a percentage of the total jobs in each of
the Employer Types listed above, and (as to Part-Time but not Temporary) as a percentage of the total jobs in each of the Job Types
listed above.
2. Weaknesses in the NALP Data
While it would be convenient to use the NALP data in their native
form, that would foster numerous serious inaccuracies. To begin with,
the NALP data have a number of weaknesses when viewed on their
own terms:
• As described above, NALP’s data categories have changed over
time in ways that do not always lend themselves to easy reconciliation, complicating comparison over time.
• Reporting in the 1970s and 1980s was decidedly spotty, with the
portion of the graduating class accounted for at responding
schools, and the number of accredited schools responding at all,
gradually increasing in the 1990s. 21 What we know about entrylevel legal employment during the 1970s and 1980s is correspondingly less reliable. 22
• The data are self-reported by the graduates’ schools, which in
turn gather the information from their graduates without meaningful outside oversight, creating possibilities for opportunistic or
(perhaps more charitably) motivated applications of the standards
defining the categories of outcomes. 23

21. See infra Part III.A.
22. The implications of this deficit are explored infra Part III.A.
23. In light of recent incidents in which law schools have misrepresented statistics
relevant to their U.S. News rankings, in 2011 the ABA added more detailed placementoutcome disclosure requirements, and stiffer penalties for their violation, to its accreditation rules. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2011–2012, at 40-42 (2011) (referring to Standard 509); see also Mark Hansen, Former Law School Employee Says in Sworn
Statement She Was Pressured to Inflate Graduates’ Job Stats, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 24, 2012, 2:59
PM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/thomas_jefferson_school_of_law_lawsuit
_inflate_employment_data_2006/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campai
gn=weekly_email; Martha Neil, ABA Raps Villanova re Inaccurate Admission Data, Says
Law School Must Post Censure Online, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 15, 2011, 3:23 PM CDT),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/abas_legal_ed_section_sanctions_villanova/; Karen
Sloan, Illinois Law Fined $250,000 for Falsifying Applicants’ Test Scores, NAT’L L.J.
(July 24, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202564243650/Illinois-Law-fined%24250%2C000-for-falsifying-applicants%27-test-scores. The breadth of compliance with
the new rules remains in question. See Karen Sloan, Problems Persist with Law School
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• The reliability and consistency risks of self-reporting are increased by the fact that some of the data categories are easily subject to manipulation by reporting schools, for example “JD Preferred” and “Unemployed—Not Seeking.” 24

At least as importantly, NALP has chosen categories and modes of
reporting that are not consistent with the circumstances it is here
argued are of greatest descriptive and predictive interest. For example, NALP has traditionally reported, and inexplicably still reports,
as “employed” any law graduate with any job of any kind, irrespective of whether that position is short-term, part-time, or completely
unrelated to the law. Thus for the Class of 2012, NALP publicly reported an “overall employment rate for new law school graduates” of
84.7% when according to the ABA’s school-by-school report of the
same law school-supplied numbers, only 56% of those graduates had
full-time, long-term positions requiring a law license, and another 9%
had full-time, long-term jobs reported as “JD Preferred.” 25
Moreover, as will be discussed further below, NALP’s reporting
categories do not neatly conform to this Article’s preferred qualitative
definitions of the circumstances of interest; indeed, since the reporting categories both evolve over time and are in a number of instances
easily malleable, they do not strictly conform to any one qualitative
definition of anything. As a result, effort is required to conform the
data more closely to the preferred qualitative definition of a Law Job
and to reconcile the evolving categories over time.
Jobs Data, Watchdog Says, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/
id=1202590850252/Problems-persist-with-law-school-jobs-data%2C-watchdog-says-; infra
note 46 (discussing recent apparent incidents of motivated placement data reporting). At
this writing, the ABA is developing an auditing program for self-reported data, which if
nothing else highlights the possibilities for opportunism the current system presents. See
Karen Sloan, Group Offers to Certify Law Schools’ Honesty, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202613421780/Group-Offers-to-Certify-Law-Schools’Honesty.
24. See infra Part II.D.1, .3, respectively.
25. NALP, EMPLOYMENT FOR THE CLASS OF 2012 — SELECTED FINDINGS 1-2 (2013),
available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2012SelectedFindings.pdf [hereinafter
NALP 2012 SELECTED FINDINGS]. By failing to exclude part-time and short-term positions,
NALP also reported that 64.4% of the Class of 2012 were in positions requiring a law license. Id. Even more oddly, the same report asserts that 58.3% of the Class of 2012 were in
full-time, long-term jobs requiring a law license nine months after graduation, id., while
the ABA’s report, offering the very same data in more granular form, yields the calculation
that only 56% of the class are in such jobs. See Employment Summary Report, supra note
15 (offering school-by-school data in multiple subcategories for the Classes of 2010–2013).
Similarly, NALP reported that 13.3% of the Class of 2012 were in JD Preferred positions,
NALP 2012 SELECTED FINDINGS, supra, at 1-2, while the ABA data yield the calculation
that only 9% of the class are in such jobs long-term and full-time, Employment Summary
Report, supra note 15 (Class of 2012 Employment Data). And as discussed infra notes 2930 and accompanying text, only some relatively modest portion of the “JD Preferred” jobs
law schools report to NALP and the ABA likely qualify as Law Jobs under the more functional definition suggested in this Article.
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The following section attempts to address some of these concerns
in extracting a quantitative measure from the NALP and ABA data
that corresponds to the proposed qualitative definition of Law Jobs.26
D. An Effort to Extract the Proposed Qualitative Measure
Quantitatively from the Available Data
1. The Degree of Relation Between the JD and the Job
One question that immediately presents itself is how law-related a
position has to be before it will be considered a Law Job. To dispose of
the easy cases, most typical Law Jobs require a law license, and almost everyone who wants a law license needs a law degree to get it.27
Thus, placements categorized as “Bar Passage Required” in the
NALP data are easy to count as Law Jobs.
Beyond positions requiring a law license, however, the question
becomes much more difficult. Clearly there are jobs that don’t require
a law license or comprise law practice by any conventional definition,
but for which a law degree provides very substantial advantages in
obtaining or performing the job that someone might rationally seek a
law degree to pursue. But a good deal more than a merely perceptible
or incremental advantage should be required before we count these
positions as Law Jobs. In order to qualify as a Law Job, the law degree must provide dramatic and substantial advantages in obtaining
or performing the job not more easily obtainable or substitutable
(whether in nature or extent) another way. For example, a law degree would likely make someone a better high school civics teacher or
paralegal, but that does not mean that law school is a rational path
to such a career.28 Unfortunately, describing and measuring the point
26. For a thoughtful and fairly rigorous alternative (though not altogether dissimilar)
quantitative definition, see Kyle P. McEntee & Derek M. Tokaz, Take This Job and Count
It, 1 J. LEGAL METRICS 309 (2012). Readers who may wish to experiment with their own
quantitative approaches to the current entry-level employment market may enjoy the “Law
Jobs: By the Numbers” calculator created by Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers, an initiative
of the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System at the University of
Denver. Law Jobs: By the Numbers, EDUCATING TOMORROW’S LAWYERS, http://educating
tomorrowslawyers.du.edu/law-jobs (last visited June 22, 2014).
27. There are a few states in which an aspirant to the bar can still “read the law” under a judge’s or lawyer’s supervision rather than attend law school as a qualification to sit
for the state’s bar examination. See, e.g., RULES OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. R. 4.29 (2014);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.4 (2013) (requiring at least one year of formal
law school before studying law under a lawyer’s supervision). But this approach is rarely
used. See Rene Ciria-Cruz, The Path Rarely Taken, CAL. LAW. (June 2011),
http://www.callawyer.com/Clstory.cfm?eid=916106 (noting that only 39 of the roughly
40,000 bar takers in California from 2006–2011 (that is, one-tenth of one percent) qualified
for the exam in this fashion).
28. It is no objection that this may actually happen from time to time, and it undoubtedly does, most often as a substitute for the “real” Law Job that a graduate is unable to
obtain. And of course it implies no disrespect for careers in primary or secondary education,
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at which a JD and a job are sufficiently related to conclude that it
makes sense to have gone to law school to get the job is both subtle
and subject to opportunism in self-reporting. This creates the quantitative challenge of how to treat the placement outcomes NALP now
calls “JD Preferred” and the ABA calls “JD Advantage[d].” 29
The JD Advantaged category was introduced in the NALP Reports
beginning with the Class of 2001. From the Class of 1982 through the
Class of 2000, NALP divided all known job types between “Legal Positions” and “Nonlegal Positions.” “Legal Positions” were substantially limited to what would now be called Bar Passage Required jobs,
and the other category appears to have comprised not only what are
now reported as JD Preferred positions, but also work having little or
no relation to the graduate’s legal studies. 30
or as a paralegal, to say that law school is not a rational way to pursue them, or that they
are not Law Jobs. It simply means there are quicker and easier ways to get there than law
school. Because a plan to attend law school with the specific goal of teaching high school
civics or becoming a paralegal would not be rational for the ordinary person, they should be
excluded from the category of Law Jobs here under discussion. See supra Part II.B.
29. This Article uses the NALP term “JD Preferred” and the ABA term “J.D.
Advantage[d]” interchangeably. The ABA defines “J.D. Advantage” positions as follows:
A position in this category is one for which the employer sought an individual
with a J.D., and perhaps even required a J.D., or for which the J.D. provided a
demonstrable advantage in obtaining or performing the job, but which does not
itself require bar passage or an active law license or involve practicing law. Examples of positions for which a J.D. is an advantage include a corporate contracts administrator, alternative dispute resolution specialist, government regulatory analyst, FBI agent, and accountant. Also included might be jobs in personnel or human resources, jobs with investment banks, jobs with consulting
firms, jobs doing compliance work in business and industry, jobs in law firm
professional development, and jobs in law school career services offices, admissions offices, or other law school administrative offices. Doctors or nurses who
plan to work in a litigation, insurance, or risk management setting, or as expert
witnesses, would fall into this category, as would journalists and teachers (in a
higher education setting) of law and law related topics. It is an indicator that a
position does not fall into this category if a J.D. is uncommon among persons
holding such a position.
ABA SECTION OF
NAIRE (FOR 2012

LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 2013 EMPLOYMENT QUESTIONGRADUATES): INFORMATION & DEFINITIONS 4 (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissi
ons_to_the_bar/governancedocuments/2013_employment_questionnaire_definitions_and_in
structions.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA 2012 DEFINITIONS].
30. In the 1980s, NALP defined a “Legal” position tautologically and without elaboration as a “legal position.” NALP CLASS OF 1982 REPORT, supra note 14. It defined “Nonlegal”
positions as “positions in management, consulting, policy analysis, speech writing, legislative drafting or similar areas in business and government; all who reported employment
that is not specifically legal are reported here.” Id. Thus the 1980s definitions suggest that
a “Legal Position” resembles a Bar Passage Required position, with most (and possibly
nearly all) JD Advantaged jobs as well as work minimally or completely unrelated to the
graduate’s legal studies categorized as “Nonlegal.”
In the early 1990s, NALP adjusted the definition of a “Legal Position” to “[a] position directly involved in the practice of law,” while defining “Non-Legal Position[s]” as
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Recent events illustrate the difficulty of isolating which placements are truly dependent enough on the placement value of a law
degree to count as Law Jobs. Nearly thirty accredited law schools
now offer pre-JD one-year master’s degrees in law, many having begun lately. One dean explained his program succinctly:
Many lawyers work in human resources, but you don’t have to
have a J.D. . . . It’s the same thing with compliance officers in
banks and hospitals. There are all these jobs in law—criminal justice jobs, law firm management jobs, consultants—where a J.D.
makes no sense but some legal training is useful. 31

However, “the very positions offered to justify a one-year master’s
[degree] ‘where a J.D. makes no sense’—‘human resources,’ ‘compliance officers,’ ‘criminal justice jobs,’ ‘consultants’—are specifically enumerated examples of ‘JD Advantage’ positions in the ABA definition.”32
Equally troubling are data suggesting that at least some jobs that
schools may want to report as JD Advantaged are ones for which a
law degree has only limited utility and to which graduates resort
principally when “real” Law Jobs are not available to them. Using
U.S. News rankings as a loose proxy for a law school’s prestige, and
thus the relative extent of employment choices generally available to
“[p]ositions that do not involve the practice of law. Examples are jobs in management, consulting, policy analysis, teaching, and retail.” NALP CLASS OF 1991 REPORT, supra note 14,
at 77. The new language appears to draw a line similar to the 1980s definition, categorizing most or all of what are now called JD Preferred positions, as well as work substantially
unrelated to the law, as “Nonlegal.”
This point of distinction became clearer in the mid-1990s, when a “Legal Position”
was again redefined as “[a] position that requires a J.D. and requires substantial use of
one’s legal skills and training.” NALP CLASS OF 1995 REPORT, supra note 14, at 85. At this
point, NALP defined “Non-Legal Positions” as:
Positions that do not require a J.D. degree and may or may not make specific
use of legal skills and background. Includes jobs in which a J.D. or some legal
background is helpful or preferred, but not required, e.g. FBI special agents, insurance agents, claims representatives, policy analysts, and jobs with legal
publishers. Includes positions in which a J.D. is neither required nor particularly applicable, such as jobs in management, teaching, and retail. Non-legal
positions are further defined as being professional, that is requiring professional skills or training, or other, that is not requiring any special professional
skills or training or a job taken on a temporary basis.
Id. Here it seems even clearer that what are now categorized as JD Preferred positions as
well as everything else not requiring a law license would fall in the “Non-Legal” category.
31. Karen Sloan, Law for Laymen; Law Schools Hope to Fill Seats by Offering Master’s
Degrees, NAT’L L.J. (May 20, 2013), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202600625077/
Law-for-Laymen (quotation marks omitted).
32. Bernie Burk, Proliferation of Pre-JD Master’s Programs Casts Doubt on the Value
of “JD Advantaged” Employment, FAC. LOUNGE (May 22, 2013, 12:35 PM),
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/05/proliferation-of-pre-jd-masters-programs-castsdoubt-on-the-value-of-jd-advantaged-employment.html; see ABA 2012 DEFINITIONS, supra
note 29.
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its graduates,33 the extent of graduates’ likely employment options is
negatively correlated with their selection of a job their schools categorize as JD Advantaged. 34 In other words, graduates with more employment options, and particularly with Bar Passage Required job
options, tend not to choose JD Advantaged jobs. As entry-level legal
employment suffered after the onset of the Great Recession in 2008,35
the JD Advantaged jobs reported increased, both in absolute numbers (from about 3100 JD Preferred placements, including part-time
and short-term, for the Class of 2007 to over 6300 for the Class of
2013, an increase of over 100%), and as a proportion of the jobs graduates found (from 8.4% of all entry-level placements being reported
as JD Preferred jobs for the Class of 2007 to 16.5% for the Class of
2013).36 Similarly, NALP’s placement data on the Class of 2012 show
that nearly three times as many holders of JD Advantaged jobs—43%
of them—were already seeking a different job nine months after
graduation than were holders of Bar Passage Required Jobs (15%). 37
33. This is not an endorsement of the accuracy or the utility for any particular purpose of the U.S. News rankings. It is merely a concession that the rankings both foster and
reflect a set of public perceptions that have real practical consequences. By far the most
influential factors in employers’ hiring decisions are the prestige of the candidates’ law
schools and their class standing or grades. See infra notes 73-74 and authorities cited.
Thus it should be no surprise that the U.S. News ranking of a graduate’s law school is very
strongly correlated with that graduate’s likelihood of getting a Law Job as defined herein
(2013: r = -.73, p < .0001; 2012: r = -.71, p < .0001; 2011: r = -.66, p < .0001). The author
used U.S. News rankings and ABA placement data for the Classes of 2011–2013 for the
calculations; the correlation coefficient is negative because the lower the school’s ordinal
rank—that is, the closer to No. 1—the greater the proportion of its graduates who obtain
Law Jobs within nine months. The increasing correlation coefficient over the last three
years seems to indicate that the tie between school prestige and placement in full-time,
long-term Bar Passage Required positions is growing stronger as employers react to the
overall contraction in the Law Job market.
34. For all JD Advantaged positions (including short-term and part-time), 2013:
r = .29, p < .0001; 2012: r = .27, p < .0001; 2011: r = .19, p < .008. (Source: U.S. News rankings and ABA school-by-school placement data for the Classes of 2011–2013.) The correlation coefficient is positive because the higher the rank number (and thus the lower the
prestige), the higher the number of JD Advantaged jobs. Again, the increase in the correlation coefficient over the last several years suggests a strengthening tie between lowerprestige schools and recourse to JD Advantaged positions.
35. See Mystal, supra note 5; infra Part III.B & Figures 1–2.
36. NALP CLASS OF 2007 REPORT, supra note 14, at 8. The 2013 percentage was calculated from ABA Class of 2013 Placement Data by dividing total number of all JD Advantaged positions by total number reported as “Employed” in any category (including parttime and short-term positions).
37. NALP 2012 SELECTED FINDINGS, supra note 25, at 4. Although the number of JD
Advantaged jobs reported has grown rapidly in the last five years, the outsized proportions
of recent law graduates dissatisfied enough with a JD Advantaged job to be seeking other
employment within months after starting is not new. Nearly 38% of the Class of 2007 with
JD Preferred positions were seeking a different job nine months after graduation, compared with less than 9% of those with jobs requiring a law license. NALP CLASS OF 2007
REPORT, supra note 14, at 108. To be clear, the point of this observation is not that JD Advantaged jobs are “worse” than Bar Passage Required jobs in some hedonic sense, but that
the large number of graduates who want a different position at or immediately after the
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In sum, while no quantitative precision is possible, all of this
makes it likely that at least some of the jobs being reported as JD
Advantaged or JD Preferred would comprise a goal for which someone might rationally seek a law degree, and thus should be counted
as Law Jobs. But it appears equally likely that quite a few of those
placements, and probably more of those reported in recent years,
should not.
How to count Law Jobs, then? As will be seen in the following sections, this Article will count as Law Jobs those placements reported
as “Legal Positions” for the classes of 1982 through 2000, and for the
classes of 2001 forward it will report Bar Passage Required and JD
Preferred jobs separately for comparison purposes. This allows the
reader to consider the range of potentially countable outcomes that
may be among the JD Preferred jobs once that category is introduced.
2. Job Characteristics
Most matriculants do not come to law school expecting marginal
or temporary employment upon graduation. Thus, part-time and
short-term employment, including short- or fixed-term engagements
funded by the graduate’s law school, generally should not be viewed
as Law Jobs.38 Unfortunately, other than an attempt to count parttime they take a JD Advantaged job indicates that a great many never wanted the JD Advantaged job at all and took it only as an alternative to something completely non-lawrelated or to unemployment.
38. Counting is complicated by the fact that a few kinds of fixed-term postgraduate
employment—principally judicial clerkships and a few high-prestige fixed-term public interest fellowships—are extremely competitive, viewed as highly prestigious, and typically
provide gateways to a wide range of coveted long-term positions. Because these fixed-term
positions generally last only a year or two, they are characterized in most datasets as
“long-term” jobs (that is, jobs lasting a year or more), and this Article’s measure of “Law
Jobs” includes them. A fair proportion of school-funded positions also appear to last a
year—quite probably to meet the ABA and NALP definitions of “long term” jobs, which are
treated more favorably for U.S. News rankings purposes—but are characteristically last
resorts providing only some transition to “real” legal employment. To the extent they can
be counted (and detailed data are available only for the classes of 2010–2012), they are
excluded from this Article’s measure of “Law Jobs.”
This is not to say that all school-funded positions are worthless: they can provide
valuable experience and references a graduate may be able to leverage into a long-term
Law Job. But ordinary people would not rationally plan to attend law school in order to
serve temporarily in a school-operated postgraduate “law firm.” See Ethan Bronner, To
Place Graduates, Law Schools Are Opening Firms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/education/law-schools-look-to-medical-education-model.
html?smid=pl-share; Karen Sloan, Think of It as a Residency for Lawyers, NAT’L L.J. (June
4,
2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202556661573&slreturn=
20130624112959. Nor would ordinary people rationally attend law school to work at a government agency or nonprofit organization without compensation other than a small fixedterm “stipend” funded by their former law school. See NALP 2012 SELECTED FINDINGS,
supra note 25, at 3. There probably are a few exceptions that prove the rule: In 2009, for
example, Yale Law School expanded a school-funded program placing graduates in oneyear internships with well-regarded government and nonprofit law offices that was at least
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time jobs between 1991 and 2000, part-time and short-term positions
were not broken out in the data reported to NALP until the Class of
2009, and school-funded positions were not broken out until the Class
of 2010. They are excluded from consideration as Law Jobs here as
soon as they can be reliably counted. 39
Law graduates who immediately hang out their shingles as solo
practitioners are excluded for similar reasons. This of course implies
no disrespect of solos; over one-third of the lawyers in America practice on their own.40 But the overwhelming majority of those solos are
more experienced lawyers. 41 Despite a few schools’ efforts to prepare
students specifically for solo practice upon graduation, 42 very few law
anecdotally reported to be highly competitive and much sought after by third-years who
had good offers from private law firms, but preferred to seek public interest work. See Yale
Law School Doubles Public Interest Fellowships, YALE L. SCH. (Oct. 28, 2008),
http://www.law.yale.edu/news/8195.htm; YLS 2010 grad, Comment to Employment Outcomes II: What We Know About School-Funded Temporary “Bridge” Positions at First-Tier
Law
Schools,
FAC.
LOUNGE
(Mar.
29,
2012,
9:09
AM,
2:19
PM),
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/03/employment-outcomes-ii-what-we-know-aboutschool-funded-temporary-bridge-positions-at-first-tier-law.html.
While there is little information regarding how widespread school-funded positions were prior to the recent unpleasantness, we do know that by 2010 they were offered
predominantly by the higher-prestige, higher-ranked, financially better-endowed law
schools. See Bernie Burk, Employment Outcomes IV: What the ABA Employment Outcomes
Data Tell Us About the Prevalence and Distribution of School-Funded “Bridge” Positions,
FAC. LOUNGE (Apr. 18, 2012, 9:48 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/04/
employment-outcomes-iv-what-the-aba-employment-outcomes-data-tell-us-about-the-preva
lence-and-distri.html (collecting data). Now that U.S. News and other commentators
are discounting school-funded positions’ value as a measure of desirable employment
outcomes, their prevalence appears to be declining. See Karen Sloan, NALP: Law Grads’
Jobs Rate Falls for Fifth Straight Year, NAT’L L.J. (June 20, 2013),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202607406858/NALP%3A-Law-Grads%27-Jobs-RateFalls-for-Fifth-Straight-Year.
39. The uncounted portion of part-time and short-time jobs before 2009 creates a consistency (normalization) problem in portraying trends in the data over time. This Article
assumes that the number of such positions prior to the Law Jobs market’s sudden contraction in 2008–2009 was modest relative to the overall number of entry-level jobs, as reflected in contemporaneous anecdotal reporting of the sudden growth in those kinds of positions
as layoffs occurred and hiring contracted. By way of comparison, from 1991 to 2000 NALP
reported how many “Legal” positions were part-time. The percentage of total graduates in
this category ranged from roughly 2.5% to 4.5% during that period. Because of this category’s likely overlap with Solo Practitioners during this period, it is not separately subtracted
from total “Legal” employment for these years.
40. CLARA N. CARSON & JEEYOON PARK, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2005, at 6 (2012).
41. The percentage of law graduates directly entering solo practice per year has fluctuated between roughly 1% and 3% since 1982, bottoming out around 1% in 1989 and 2002,
and jumping from about 1.4% to about 2% of the graduating class (2.6% of all entry-level
jobs) during the recent recession. That amounts to perhaps 1000 or fewer new school-tosolo practitioners most years. The author compiled this data from the NALP Reports for
the Classes of 1982–2011. In total, there are over 300,000 solos nationwide. CARSON &
PARK, supra note 40, at 6.
42. See Bronner, supra note 38; Karen Sloan, Cleveland Solo Incubator Reflects Students’ Choice of Careers, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/
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students are realistically prepared to practice without more experienced supervision on the day they pass the bar exam (let alone have
clients to practice on). Moreover, solo practice straight out of school is
strongly negatively correlated with school prestige, suggesting that
this placement is chosen disproportionately by those with fewer alternatives.43 The category is also subject to reporting abuse, because
a school may be tempted to report its unemployed more favorably as
self-employed. 44
3. Graduates Not Seeking Work or Pursuing Full-Time Studies
NALP has long requested schools to report which of their unemployed graduates are, and are not, actively seeking work. While some
have opted to count “Not Seeking” as neither employed nor unemployed (by excluding those not seeking employment from the denominator of any fraction measuring the proportion of graduates who are
“employed,” thus giving that fraction a higher value), this Article will
treat “Unemployed—Not Seeking” as unemployed.
The reasons are straightforward. Most simply, unemployed is unemployed, which is not a state of affairs that an ordinary person
would rationally plan to attend law school to achieve. It seems odd
not to count it as such just because the graduate has purportedly decided not to try to work at a particular point in time. 45 Finally, the
“Not Seeking” category creates the temptation for motivated or dishonest reporting if it receives any advantage over ordinary unem-

id=1202580245761/Cleveland-solo-incubator-reflects-students%27-choice-of-careers-.
43. 2013: r = .51, p < .0001; 2012: r = .47, p < .0001; 2011: r = .53, p < .0001. (Source:
US News Rankings and ABA School-by-School Placement Data for the Classes of 2011–
2013.) Again, the correlation coefficient is positive because higher numerical law school
ranking indicates lower prestige.
44. Two or three graduates also may join together after graduation in small firms
with the same characteristics as the solos just described. While this likely occurs, and
would be excluded from the Law Jobs count for the same reasons as just discussed if it
could be identified, there are no data on how many small firms of this kind are formed each
year. Given the prevalence of smaller firms among more experienced lawyers (nearly
150,000 lawyers practice in such firms nationwide, see CARSON & PARK, supra note 40, at 6),
placement with a firm of 2-10 is generally counted as a Law Job.
45. There is no detailed empirical evidence of nonseekers’ reasons for not seeking
employment, but the availability of fewer meaningful employment opportunities is at least
a plausible explanation for many, whether because of an unsuccessful first try on a bar
exam or a constricted Law-Job market. This inference is buttressed by the fact that the
number of nonseeking graduates from a particular school is inversely correlated with the
school’s prestige (2013: r = .24, p < .001; 2012: r = .22, p < .002; 2011: r = .23, p < .002;
source: U.S. News rankings and ABA School-by-School Placement Data for the Classes of
2011–2013), and that conventional entry-level Law Jobs are correlated with school prestige,
see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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ployment. In fact, there is quantitative evidence suggesting that this
has already occurred.46
Pursuing full-time studies rather than working is also not counted
as a Law Job for similar reasons. To begin with, in the simplest sense,
seeking another degree is not working at a law-centered job. Moreover, it appears that many graduates pursuing further education are
not the star students of elite institutions seeking PhDs in the social
sciences or history in preparation for academic careers, but rather
discouraged job-seekers pursuing LLMs in the probably misguided
hope that it will improve their lot in the job market. 47 Thus, while
some portion of these students probably are doing something an ordinary person might rationally plan to go to law school to do, it appears to be a minority, and in all events the one thing we know they
are not doing is working.

46. For many years U.S. News excluded nonseekers from the denominator of the fraction of a school’s graduating class considered “employed” for purposes of calculating its
rankings. This created a rankings advantage for schools that reported greater numbers of
their unemployed graduates as not seeking work. U.S. News suspended this practice in
2008 but resumed it in 2009, warning schools not to fudge their numbers. See Robert
Morse, Another Law Ranking Methodology Change, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 9,
2008), http://www.usnews.com/education/ blogs/college-rankings-blog/2008/07/09/anotherlaw-ranking-methodology-change. Paul Campos has reported that by February 2010, thirty-five law schools “reported having more than twice as many unemployed not-seeking
graduates as unemployed-seeking graduates.” A Note on the Reliability of the Employment
Data Reported by Law Schools, INSIDE THE L. SCH. SCAM (Feb. 23, 2013, 10:12 AM),
http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2013/02/a-note-on-reliability-of-employment.html
(emphasis in original). When U.S. News announced in 2011 that it was again suspending
the advantaged treatment of those reported as Not Seeking, “the number of schools that
reported having more than twice as many unemployed not-seeking graduates as unemployed-seeking fell from 35 to 4.” Id.
47. Some states allow the holder of a foreign law degree otherwise unqualified to do so
to sit for their bar examinations with an LLM from an accredited American law school. See,
e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.6 (2013). And a very small number of specialized and selective LLM programs, such as NYU’s, the University of Florida’s, and
Georgetown’s LLM programs in taxation, likely do open doors in the practice world. Unfortunately, the great majority of post-JD law degrees do not appear to be nearly as effective
in this regard. See, e.g., Elie Mystal, What Is the Value of an LLM Degree?, ABOVE THE L.
(Sept. 22, 2010, 10:07 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/09/what-is-the-value-of-an-llmdegree/; Karen Sloan, Big Law Firms Don’t Care About Your LL.M., Recruiter Warns,
NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202537948154
&Big_law_firms_dont_care_about_your_LLM_recruiter_warns. While the correlation between lack of school prestige and proportion of students seeking a further degree is statistically significant for the Class of 2011 (r = .17, p = .02), the relationship for the two most
recent graduating Classes is only barely or not significant (2013: r = .13, p < .08; 2012:
r = .10, p < .15). (Source: US News Rankings and ABA School-by-School Placement Data for
the Classes of 2011–2013.) This development may suggest that, earlier in the recession,
greater numbers of marginal job seekers from less prestigious schools sought LLMs to improve their chances in the job market, but that press reports on the ineffectuality of this
strategy discouraged greater numbers from pursuing the same course over the last couple
of years.
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4. Unknown Outcomes
It is inevitable that there will be graduates whose employment
status is unknown despite the good-faith efforts of their law schools.
Some of them will have legitimate Law Jobs. Nevertheless, this Article does not count them as so employed unless their schools report
them as such. The reasons are similar to those described in the preceding section. While there are (by definition) no empirical data
available on what the unknown outcomes actually are, it stands to
reason that they are disproportionately bad: as a practical matter,
people with jobs they are proud of seem more likely to respond to
their schools’ inquiries, and schools seem more likely to seek out and
report good results. Unknown outcomes in a particular school’s graduating class are strongly inversely correlated with the school’s prestige, suggesting that more outcomes are likely to be reported as unknown by schools having worse employment results overall. 48 And
finally, treating unknowns as anything other than not holding a Law
Job is an incentive for reporting schools to avoid learning (or disclosing) bad news.
Put slightly differently, it seems unlikely that graduates whose
employment status is unknown are disproportionately more successful than their reporting classmates. Thus it likely minimizes the inaccuracy inherent in not knowing the status of some portion of the
population to count the unknowns as not holding Law Jobs.
5. Summary: Law Jobs and the Law Jobs Ratio
Translating all of this onto the NALP data available, the Law Jobs
obtained by each graduating class beginning with 1982 can be described as follows:
• 1982–1990: Legal Positions – Solo Practitioners
• 2001–2008: Bar Passage Required [+ JD Preferred] 49 – Solo Practitioners2009: Full-Time (“FT”) Bar Passage Required [+ FT JD
Preferred] – Full-Time, Long-Term (“FTLT”) Solo Practitioners 50
48. 2013: r = .35, p < .0001; 2012: r = .35, p < .0001; 2011: r = .39, p < .0001. (Source:
US News Rankings and ABA School-by-School Placement Data for the Classes of 2011–
2013.) But see Gary Rosin, Unknowns: Selection Bias?, FAC. LOUNGE (Dec. 19, 2011, 2:38
PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2011/12/unknowns-selection-bias.html. Rosin found
at most a “weak” inverse relationship between rates of graduates reported as unknown and
rates of graduates reported as “employed.” However, this study did not test the proposition
asserted in the text—that people with jobs they are proud of are more likely to report
them—because it apparently used an “employed” rate based on any job, whether or not
long-term, full-time, or in any way law-related.
49. The JD Preferred positions are in brackets to signify that measurements will be
offered both with and without them.
50. Counting of part-time and short-term positions in 2009 and 2010 is complicated by
the fact that NALP and the ABA collected data that indicated only whether job types (such
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• 2010: FT Bar Passage Required [+ FT JD Preferred] – SchoolFunded – FTLT Solo Practitioners
• 2011–2013: FTLT Bar Passage Required [+ FTLT JD Preferred]
– FTLT School-Funded – FTLT Solo Practitioners

For purposes of describing the entry-level legal employment market, this Article also employs what it calls the “Law Jobs Ratio.” This
is simply the ratio for any given graduating class of Law Jobs to the
total number of graduates that year, and it represents the portion of
the graduating class in any given year that has obtained Law Jobs as
defined here within nine months of graduation.
With the discussion of data and metrics complete, let’s see what
these measures can tell us about where we have been and where we
may be going.
III. HOW THE ENTRY-LEVEL LAW JOB MARKET HAS DEVELOPED
OVER THE LAST THIRTY YEARS
A picture of the changes in the entry-level legal employment market is presented in Figure 1, which depicts the Law Jobs Ratio (based
on available data) for the Classes of 1982 through 2013. Figure 1
maps the Ratio both with and without JD Advantaged placements
after 2000. Figure 2 compares the number of Law Jobs with the total
number of graduates over the same period.

as Bar Passage Required) were part-time or full-time; as for employer types (such as Solo
Practitioner), the data indicate whether positions were reported as part-time or short-term,
but not which ones were both. Thus the part-time and short-term numbers, where available, each redundantly include positions that are both. These figures were normalized by
determining the average proportion of PTST jobs in 2011, 2012, and 2013 when those data
are available, and adjusting the 2009 and 2010 numbers accordingly.
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Figure 1 shows an anemic Law Jobs Ratio in the 1980s that improves substantially during the 1990s and 2000s. While the Ratio
dips or slows its rise in tandem with or slightly after the recessions
of the early 1980s, early 1990s, and early 2000s, it otherwise tends
to rise throughout the thirty-year period portrayed, indicating the
generally increasing ability of new law graduates to obtain Law Jobs,
even as the absolute number of law graduates steadily increases as
illustrated in Figure 2. This fairly consistent rise in the Law Jobs
Ratio ends in a rapid and substantial fall, indicating a corresponding
decrease in the proportion of law graduates able to obtain a Law
Job within nine months after graduation, contemporaneously with
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the onset of the Great Recession. If the increase after 2007 of
JD Advantaged positions is considered (as discussed above) to be disproportionately not Law Jobs, the decrease depicted after 2007 is
even greater. 51
These observations raise a number of questions: Why is the Ratio
so low in the 1980s relative to other periods, with steady increases
across the 1990s after the recession early in that decade? Why is the
best Law Jobs Ratio in recent history (in 2007) something less than
80%, indicating that at the peak of the market one in five graduates
still failed to obtain a Law Job within nine months? Has there ever
been something we could loosely characterize as close to full employment in the entry-level legal job market, and how would we know?
A. What Do We Know About the 1980s and 1990s?
The first possibility to consider is that these measurements are
more or less accurate, or at least consistent over time. That would
suggest that the market for new lawyers was much worse throughout
the 1980s than in subsequent decades, and improved appreciably but
somewhat gradually over the 1990s, accelerating during the 2000s
until 2007. While this is possible, significant parts of it seem unlikely.
By all indications, the 1980s (after the Reagan Recession) and 1990s
(other than during the recession in the early part of the decade) seem
to have been periods of fairly consistent high demand for new lawyers. This demand is reflected in the opening of twenty-eight new
ABA-accredited law schools between 1980 and 2007, with a corresponding 24% increase in the total number of JDs granted per year
while the Law Jobs Ratio (that is, the proportion of graduates each
year who got Law Jobs soon after graduation) continued to rise, 52 and
the paucity of any significant contemporaneous observations that a
very substantial complement of law graduates corresponding to the
difference between the Ratio in the early 1980s and in the late 1990s
were unable to find suitable uses for their degrees. 53
51. See supra Part II.C.1. As noted above, these observations describe the entry-level
job market. What has happened over time to demand for more experienced lawyers of various kinds, while undoubtedly important, is beyond the scope of this Article, and may differ.
52. Enrollment and Degrees Awarded: 1963–2012, A.B.A., http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statis
tics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited June 22, 2014); see supra
Figures 1–2.
53. The contemporaneous legal press generally confirms these impressions (though it
should be noted that the legal press focuses disproportionately on larger firms). During and
shortly after the severe Reagan Recession of the early 1980s, graduates struggled to find
law jobs. See Jay G. Foonberg, A Law Degree Opens Many Doors: Graduates Don’t Have to
Take Traditional Jobs, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 1, 1983, at 28. As the Reagan Recession resolved,
entry-level legal employment became increasingly vigorous. See, e.g., Paula S. Linden, Gail
G. Peshel & Jamienne S. Studley, What Happened to Class of ’87?: Most Went to Private
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Those observations in turn suggest that the measurements from
the 1980s and portions of the 1990s are problematic. One possible
explanation is that there is something wrong with this Article’s qualitative definition of Law Jobs; another is that there is something
wrong with the quantitative translation of that definition onto the
available data. The qualitative definition has been explained in Part
II and does not appear to have potential defects that could explain
the particular details under consideration. The quantitative translation, however, may have created some distortions.
One of these distortions may result from the fact that the rate of
nonreporting changed significantly over the period examined. Figure
3 details the percentage of the total number of graduates who attended a school that failed to participate in placement reporting at all,
as well as the percentage of graduates from a reporting school whose
employment status was reported as unknown. The proportion of both
nonreporting schools and of nonresponding graduates at reporting
schools is much higher in the early 1980s (near the beginning of
NALP’s data-gathering project) than later—as much as 35% of the
graduating class was unaccounted for in the early-to-mid 1980s, with
over half of that attributable to law schools that did not report at all.

Practice, Annual Study by NALP Shows, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 27, 1989, at 18; Daniel Trigoboff,
More Law Grads Turn to Major Firms, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 19, 1983, at 10; Thomas R.
Trowbridge III, Dramatic Increase in Number of Jobs Affects Recruiting, N.Y. L.J., May 15,
1989, at 1. Strains returned to the job market during the recession of the early 1990s. See,
e.g., Claudia MacLachlan, Another Paltry Summer: The Largest Firms Offer Even Fewer
Jobs, NAT’L L.J., June 8, 1992, at 21; Ken Myers, New Placement Survey Confirms Just
How Bleak Job Market Is, NAT’L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 10; Jamienne S. Studley, Legal Recruiting in a Slow-Growth Market, RECORDER, Mar. 14, 1991, at 2. While the recovery took
hold in pockets, see Mike France, Glory Years’ Are Gone: Fewer Grads Get Traditional Legal Jobs, NAT’L L.J., July 17, 1995, at 28; Marcia Pennington Shannon, Temporary Jobs
That Build a Resume: The Jobs Are Out There, but It Can Take a While to Find the Right
One. Here’s What to Do While Waiting, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 1994, at 14, hiring boomed again as
the economy recovered. See, e.g., Ken Myers, Placement Officials See Upticks in Summer
Jobs, Full-Time Offers, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 3, 1995, at 11; Cynthia L. Rold, Jobs for the Many,
Not Just the Stars: Ace Students Are Generally Self-Confident, but the Rest of the Class Has
Wide Options, Too, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 1994, at 18; Anna Snider, City’s Firms Lure Back Most
Summer Associates, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 19, 1999, at 3.
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As Figure 3 illustrates, both nonreporting rates fall over the 1980s
and 1990s until they more or less level out in the late 1990s under
10%. 54 Because the definition of Law Jobs used here excludes any
unknown result from being counted as a Law Job, the initially higher
extent of nonreporting (especially of entire graduating classes at nonreporting schools) likely appreciably underreports Law Jobs and depresses the Law Jobs Ratio in the 1980s, and does so at a rate that
later declines until the late 1990s.
Another possible distortion in the data concerns JD Advantaged
jobs. As discussed above, most or all JD Advantaged jobs, including
most or all of those that should count as Law Jobs, cannot be differentiated in the available data until after 2000. 55 There are no reliable
data of which the author is aware from which the proportion of JD
Advantaged placements during this period that should qualify as
Law Jobs could be estimated. The result may well be that Law Jobs
between 1982 and 2000 are to some degree undercounted for this
separate reason as well.

54. There are likely several reasons for the change over time. The notion of reporting
placement data undoubtedly became more commonplace and widely accepted over time,
creating a self-reinforcing norm of reporting that also (and significantly) became externally
enforced when the ABA adopted placement-reporting requirements as a condition of accreditation in 1996. See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS, Std. 509 & Interp. 509-1, at
49 (Aug. 1996), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/
legal_education/Standards/standardsarchive/1996_standards.authcheckdam.pdf. At least as
important to the increase in reporting levels is the advent of the Internet, email, and social
media, which simplify and accelerate locating and communicating with alumni, and in
many cases also determining their employment status even if they fail to respond.
55. See supra Part II.C.1.
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B. Is There Anything New Lately?
Figure 1 shows a sudden and rapid decline in the Law Jobs Ratio
after 2007. Some observers nevertheless contend that the deterioration of the legal job market is nothing particularly new. 56 Figure 1
and 2 suggest otherwise, showing that—at least at the entry level—
even as the number of law graduates increased during the 1990s
and 2000s, the number of Law Jobs appears to have increased even
faster, leading to a Law Jobs Ratio peak in about 2007 at something
less than 80% (or somewhat less to the extent JD Advantaged jobs
are discounted). 57
The reasons for this decline are debatable and will be discussed in
Part V below. But one thing that is difficult to debate is that the entry-level Law Jobs market has shrunk substantially and rapidly
since 2007.
C. What Might Comprise a Practical Maximum
Law Jobs Ratio at the Entry Level?
Given the likely correct conventional wisdom that the 1980s
through 2007 were, outside of periods of recession, generally times of
robust and increasing entry-level legal hiring, it may seem somewhat
surprising that the best Law Jobs Ratio in the last thirty years is only 70% to 77% (depending on how many JD Preferred placements are
counted as Law Jobs). This result becomes less surprising when
the particular circumstances of entry-level employment are taken
into account.
The most significant impediment to entry-level placement is probably bar examination results. Roughly 20% of all law graduates nationwide fail the bar exam each year on their first attempt. 58 Some of
those who fail the bar the first time get Law Jobs within nine months
of graduation anyway; some larger law firms extend employment offers before graduation and allow their associates to fail the exam
56. See, e.g., Marc Gans, Not a New Problem: How the State of the Legal Profession
Has Been Secretly in Decline for Quite Some Time (June 24, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2173144. William
Henderson has argued that law firm employment of both attorneys at all levels of seniority
and staff was “stagnating” for several years prior to the onset of the Great Recession, which
is not necessarily inconsistent with the sudden changes documented here in the market for
entry-level lawyers as the recession began. See infra note 113.
57. As discussed in the following section, although this may initially seem a surprisingly low historic high, it reflects some relatively common reasons for failure to obtain a
Law Job within nine months of graduation, principally (though not exclusively) failure on a
graduate’s first try on a bar exam.
58. See Bar Examination and Admission Statistics, NAT’L CONF. BAR EXAMINERS
(2014), available at http://www.ncbex.org/publications/statistics/ (compiling statistics from
each year’s report). The 20% first-time failure rate is a composite figure; pass rates differ
from state to state.
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once without immediate adverse result, and some unsuccessful firsttime bar takers probably find their way into genuinely JDAdvantaged positions that do not require a law license but for which
a law degree actually makes a serious and substantial difference in
the ability to obtain and perform the job. 59 But many Law Jobs require a law license, and many employers do not even consider candidates until they have one. 60 The NALP data is gathered roughly nine
months after graduation—enough time to study for and take a bar
exam, receive the results, and spend a few months job-hunting after
passing, but not enough time to get results on a second attempt if the
first is unsuccessful. Thus some significant portion of the roughly
20% of graduates who fail the bar exam on their first try are unlikely
to hold a Law Job as of the NALP reporting date.61
Other natural exclusions from those able to obtain Law Jobs within nine months after graduation seem likely. Some graduates conclude that they simply do not wish to practice law (or work in a job
sufficiently law-related that it ought to be considered a Law Job).
Some, with pressing student loan obligations or basic economic needs,
may feel the need to take any job that helps pay the bills while continuing to look for a Law Job. 62 Still others, owing to uninspiring performance in law school (particularly at less prestigious schools) or
personal quirks likely to emerge in an interview, may struggle to find
any job in the currently oversupplied market until well past the reporting date. 63 And it should be recalled that while counting an unreported outcome as not employed in a Law Job is probably more accurate than excluding it from both the numerator and the denominator
of the Law Jobs Ratio, it also almost certainly undercounts the number of Law Jobs among those not reporting to some degree, even at
59. See, e.g., Sarah Mui, How Does Your Firm Handle Unlicensed Law Grads? What
Happens if They Fail the Bar Exam?, A.B.A. J. (June 20, 2012, 11:39 AM CST),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/how_does_your_firm_handle_unlicensed_law_grad
s; What Happens if You Fail the Bar Exam the First Time?, TOP-LAW-SCHOOLS.COM (Mar.
31, 2011, 1:17 AM), http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=23&t=151960;
What Happens to Your Job if You Fail the Bar?, ALL4JDS (Sept. 27, 2012, 4:26 PM),
http://all4jds.com/forums/aft/19689.aspx.
60. See, e.g., Barros, supra note 2; Elie Mystal, Should the ABA Push Back Jobs Data
Collection from Nine Months to Ten Months After Graduation?, ABOVE THE L. (June 11,
2013, 1:27 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/06/should-the-aba-push-back-jobs-datacollection-from-nine-months-to-ten-months-after-graduation/.
61. And at less prestigious schools where bar passage rates tend to be lower, this factor
will likely have disproportionate impact on entry-level employment nine months after graduation compared with graduating classes from schools with higher first-attempt pass rates.
62. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
63. A small-scale study of recent graduates from Widener Law School’s Harrisburg
campus suggests that, while some new graduates unemployed after nine months had a Law
Job three to six months after the nine-month reporting deadline, some of them did not obtain
their first Law Jobs until two or three years after graduation. Barros, supra note 2, at 3.
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the relatively low levels of nonreporting that prevail after the turn of
the century. It does not take a great many of these circumstances,
combined with the portion of graduates delayed from obtaining employment by first-time bar exam failure, to suggest that a Law Jobs
Ratio of about 80% may approach the highest level of Law-Job employment nine to ten months after graduation that is likely to be
achievable in the entry-level legal markets of the last thirty years. 64
IV. WHAT’S NEW ABOUT THE NEW NORMAL?
Beyond the consensus that the market for new lawyers is much
more constricted than it was five years ago, there has been surprisingly little investigation regarding the more particular characteristics of the contraction. This Part will begin to fill that gap.
To illustrate how the market has changed, Figures 4-A and 4-B
graph the numbers in each graduating class with Law Jobs that
require a law license in the various employer categories annually
reported to NALP.65 Figures 5-A and 5-B graph the number of Law
Jobs in those categories that are either Bar Passage Required or
JD Preferred.

64. It is fair to ask whether this hypothesized 80% limit is nothing more than a measure of what happened to be the best Law-Jobs market in recent history, or whether it also
reflects some deeper truths about the entry-level Law-Job market. Certainty is of course
elusive, but one basic fact seems probative: As Figure 2 generally illustrates, the 2000s
marked the culmination of an extended period of substantial and consistent growth not
only in the number of available entry-level Law Jobs, but in the output of the legal academy as well. If we accept the significant but not irrational assumption that this market, like
most others, tends dynamically more or less to equilibrium over time, the extended period
of consistent growth in both demand for and supply of new law graduates suggests at least
the possibility that consumption of new lawyers was approaching its practical limits when
the bottom fell out in 2008. There are numerous variables at play, not least among them
the degree of risk potential law school applicants were willing to tolerate (probably mediated by the press, which for a long time presented prospects as excellent and then, rather
suddenly, as terrible, when in both cases the reality was more situational and nuanced),
the very significant increase in the cost of a law degree over the last ten to fifteen years (see
supra note 10), and how confounded, motivated, or just plain bad the estimates of demand
for additional output may have been by those who yearned to open new law schools or expand existing ones. How translatable this tentative measure of a practical maximum Law
Jobs Ratio may be to conditions prevailing some years from now when new lawyers may be
filling different niches in the job market, the cost of a law degree may have changed, and
legal services may be produced with different staffing and pricing, remains to be seen.
65. NALP reports the numbers in each Employer Type without direct reference to
which placements have the characteristics of Law Jobs discussed in Part II.C, supra. Calculations to limit the totals to Law Jobs are in some cases approximations.
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The differences among different market sectors are quite striking.
Figures 4A and 5A show all the employer types on which NALP reports from 1991–2012.66 Placement in non-law-firm employer categories (Academic, Business & Industry, Government, Judicial Clerkship, and Public Interest, whether or not Law Jobs) has shown strikingly little variability over the last twenty years generally, and collectively was down only about 5% overall during the 2008–2012 period. Hiring in non-BigLaw firms (fewer than 100 attorneys, excluding
solos for the reasons discussed supra Part II.C.2) was also down only
about 5%. 67 Figures 4B and 5B show the sectors other than small
firms (2-10) and BigLaw (over 100) on a dilated scale so that the relative differences can be discerned. But it should be borne in mind that
in both absolute and percentage terms the sectors other than small
firms and BigLaw have remained relatively stable over the last twen66. NALP data for the Class of 2013 was unavailable at the time this Article went to
press.
67. The spike in Business positions during 2008–2012 likely reflects the disproportionate increase in jobs reported as JD Advantaged or Professional that was apparently
forced by the contraction in available Bar Passage Required positions. See supra notes 3337 and accompanying text. The jump in Public Interest positions during the same period
probably reflects the large number of laid-off or deferred BigLaw associates, some of whom
received grants or stipends from their firms to perform such work. See Burk & McGowan,
supra note 4, at 27-33. There was also a sharp increase in school-funded Public Interest
jobs, only some of which could be factored out of the data before graphing. See supra notes
38-39 and accompanying text. Solos straight out of school increased in number, probably
because many of these graduates had no other options. The number of new graduates taking jobs in small firms (2-10 lawyers) also increased modestly, which is consistent with the
long-term inverse relationship between entry-level hiring in BigLaw and in firms of 2-10
lawyers illustrated in Figures 4-5. All of these comparisons suffer from some degree of
mismatch, both between the Classes of 2007 and 2011, and between the job counts listed
here and the Law Jobs counted elsewhere in this Article. NALP started counting which
placements were only part-time in 2009, and which were short-term in 2011. Thus the
2007 placement numbers likely include some complement of part-time or short-term jobs
that are excluded from the 2011 numbers. See supra note 39. Given that the Class of 2007
enjoyed more or less the high-water mark for Law Jobs both in absolute numbers and in
Law Jobs Ratio, while short-term and part-time jobs appear to have become much more
common as the Great Recession descended, the distortion caused by the inability to count
part-time and short-term positions in 2007 is hopefully only modest. Separately and in
addition, the employer categories cut across whether the placement within the employer
category requires or prefers a law degree; thus employment in any of these categories could
be other than a Law Job. For example, a job with a law firm could be as a paralegal or secretary rather than as a lawyer; a position in Business & Industry could be as an in-house
lawyer or compliance officer (though such positions are still relatively rare straight out of
school), but also could be anything from a nonlegal manager or salesperson to a janitor. See
ABA 2012 DEFINITIONS, supra note 29, at 6-7. For the Class of 2011, Law Firm employment was reported 94% as Bar Passage Required, with another 5.5% JD Preferred. Government and Public Interest are each a little less than 75% Bar Passage required, and a
little less than 20% JD Preferred. In contrast, Business is only 29% Bar Passage Required
and 38% JD Preferred, while Academic jobs are reported 26% Bar Passage Required and
46% JD Preferred. NALP CLASS OF 2011 REPORT, supra note 14, at 15. The comparisons in
the text are made with the best approximations the author could achieve of the number of
Law Jobs in each Employer Type.

2014]

THE NEW NORMAL

575

ty years, even as the entry-level market overall has changed dramatically. By contrast, during the recent tumble into the New Normal,
hiring at firms larger than 100 lawyers (“BigLaw”) 68 has fallen by
over one-third, from 19% to 12% of the graduating class, and from 22%
to 14% of all full-time, long-term jobs obtained. 69 By comparison,
placement in non-law firm employer categories (Academic, Business
& Industry, Government, Judicial Clerkship, and Public Interest,
whether or not Law Jobs) has shown strikingly little variability over
the last twenty years generally, and was down only about 5% overall
during the 2008–2012 period. Hiring in non-BigLaw firms (fewer
than 100 attorneys, excluding solos for the reasons discussed supra
Part II.C.2) was also down only about 5%. 70
68. It is fair to ask why the author chose to group firms of over 100 attorneys together
as “BigLaw,” when some might envision only much larger organizations as properly responsive to that label. The reason is purely functional: While every law firm is unique, and
subpopulations of comparable size may generally share some features in more comparable
proportions, firms over about 100 lawyers in size generally have many features in common
that are both central to the analysis here and much less common in other practice aggregations. These include a business model that seeks complex, premium work charged at premium rates, an array of skilled and developing specialists that work collaboratively to
serve their clients’ complex needs, an evolving promotion-and-retention model that historically centered around “up or out” promotion to partnership, and a historically “leveraged”
service model. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 4, at 8-10 (basic historical form), 11-27
(evolution generally consistent with the form from the 1970s up to the Great Recession),
27-39 (developments during the early years of the Recession); see also infra Part IV.B. For
reference, in 2013 the 350th largest law firm in the United States had 117 lawyers. See The
2013 NLJ 350, NAT’L L.J. (June 10, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.
jsp?id=1202603325795.
69. These percentages come from a comparison of data located in NALP CLASS OF
2007 REPORT and NALP CLASS OF 2012 REPORT, supra note 14. Some portion of this
BigLaw hiring was probably in “staff” or “discovery” attorney positions, non-partnershiptrack placements that pay perhaps one-half to one-third as much as conventional associate
jobs and are billed out at much lower rates to do simpler and more repetitive work such as
document review, due diligence, and customization of form agreements. See, e.g., Ralph
Baxter, Michael A. McAndrews & Will Turani, At the Beginning, AM. LAW., Nov. 1, 2012, at
41; Meredith Hobbs, A Lawyer’s Job, with Time for Life, DAILY REP. (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202614513218&slreturn=20130
718132845; Justin Miller, Second Tier Associates, a New Trend in Big Law, RECORDER
(July 14, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202463535998; Catherine
Rampell, At Well-Paying Law Firms, a Low-Paid Corner, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/business/24lawyers.html.
70. The spike in Business positions during 2008–2012 likely reflects the disproportionate increase in jobs reported as JD Advantaged or Professional that was apparently
forced by the contraction in available Bar Passage Required positions. See supra notes 3337 and accompanying text. The jump in Public Interest positions during the same period
probably reflects the large number of laid-off or deferred BigLaw associates, some of whom
received grants or stipends from their firms to perform such work. See Burk & McGowan,
supra note 4, at 27-33. There was also a sharp increase in school-funded Public-Interest
jobs, only some of which could be factored out of the data before graphing. See supra notes
38-39 and accompanying text. Solos straight out of school increased in number, probably
because many of these graduates had no other options. The number of new graduates taking jobs in small firms (2-10 lawyers) also increased modestly, which is consistent with the
long-term inverse relationship between entry-level hiring in BigLaw and in firms of 2-10
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Put slightly differently, over half of all the full-time, long-term
Bar Passage Required jobs that were lost between the Class of 2007
and the Class of 2011 were lost out of BigLaw alone, even though in
2007 BigLaw hired less than one-fifth of the graduating class. 71 Thus
simply as a matter of volume, many of the recent contractions in the
entry-level Law Jobs market are focused far more in larger private
law firms than in any other sector of the legal employment market.
And there are good reasons to believe that changes in BigLaw hiring are also disproportionately disruptive to hiring in most other sectors of the entry-level Law Job market. 72 Law school prestige and
grades or class standing have been for generations, and largely remain, the principal criteria of entry-level employability for all kinds
lawyers illustrated in Figures 4–5. All of these comparisons suffer from some degree of
mismatch, both between the classes of 2007 and 2011, and between the job counts listed
here and the Law Jobs counted elsewhere in this Article. NALP started counting which
placements were only part-time in 2009, and which were short-term in 2011. Thus the
2007 placement numbers likely include some complement of part-time or short-term jobs
that are excluded from the 2011 numbers. See supra note 39. Given that the Class of 2007
enjoyed more or less the high-water mark for Law Jobs both in absolute numbers and in
Law Jobs Ratio, while short-term and part-time jobs appear to have become much more
common as the Great Recession descended, the distortion caused by the inability to count
part-time and short-term positions in 2007 is hopefully only modest. Separately and in
addition, the employer categories cut across whether the placement within the employer
category requires or prefers a law degree; thus employment in any of these categories could
be other than a Law Job. For example, a job with a law firm could be as a paralegal or secretary rather than as a lawyer; a position in Business & Industry could be as an in-house
lawyer or compliance officer (though such positions are still relatively rare straight out of
school), but also could be anything from a nonlegal manager or salesperson to a janitor. See
ABA 2012 DEFINITIONS, supra note 29, at 6-7. For the Class of 2011, Law Firm employment was reported 94% as Bar Passage Required, with another 5.5% JD Preferred. Government and Public Interest are each a little less than 75% Bar Passage required, and a
little less than 20% JD Preferred. In contrast, Business is only 29% Bar Passage Required
and 38% JD Preferred, while Academic jobs are reported 26% Bar Passage Required and
46% JD Preferred. NALP CLASS OF 2011 REPORT, supra note 14, at 15. The comparisons in
the text are made with the best approximations the author could achieve of the number of
Law Jobs in each Employer Type.
71. Part-time and short-term entry-level positions are now strikingly rare in BigLaw,
comprising only 1% of the reported hires. They are much more common in smaller firms,
including 15% of the hires in firms of 2-10, and 14% of the hires in firms of 11-50. (Source:
ABA Class of 2012 employment data.) It appears that smaller firms are taking on new law
graduates on a low-cost, low-commitment “tryout” basis while they have the luxury of a
buyer’s market to do so. Presumably the larger firms are filling some of this need with
permanent “staff” attorneys, see supra note 69, and the rest with more experienced lawyers
with whom they are already familiar (including associates they laid off in 2009 and 2010,
and current associates who wish to step off the partnership track) willing to do part-time
and short-term contract work; the firms thus do not need to take chances on new graduates
with no track record, practice experience, or skills. By contrast, part-time and temporary
entry-level positions were widespread outside larger law firms, with 47% of all Academic
positions, 27% of all Public Interest positions, 24% of all Business positions, and 14% of all
Government positions, part-time, short-term, or both. (Source: ABA Class of 2012 placement data.)
72. “Disruptive” here is intended to mean “disturbing to the established order of
things,” not necessarily “interfering with” or “preventing.”
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of Law Jobs. 73 Because of the longstanding and still widespread belief
among law students that BigLaw offers rich compensation and
stimulating, high-profile work, significant numbers of the most employable law graduates (that is, with credentials most likely to appeal to any prospective employer) have gravitated, and continue to
gravitate, toward it. 74 When entry-level opportunities in BigLaw suddenly constrict, as they have over the last six years, some of the highly credentialed candidates who previously might have landed there
must seek other opportunities. Because they are among the candidates most attractive to other employers as well, they tend to displace the somewhat less well-credentialed candidates who had gen73. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance
Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1244-46 & n.51 (1991)
(relating how, in 1991, larger law firms were looking beyond the top 10% of the top 10 law
schools simply because the supply did not meet their demand); Richard Sander & Jane
Bambauer, The Secret of My Success: How Status, Eliteness, and School Performance
Shape Legal Careers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 893, 925 (2012) (“Major law firms hire
from a wide range of law schools, employing heuristics that weigh law school performance
against law school eliteness.”); William D. Henderson, Why the Job Market Is Changing,
NAT’L JURIST, Nov. 2010, at 20, 21 (“In 2007 and 2008, 46 percent of all entry-level associates at an AmLaw 100 law firm were graduates of a Top 14 law school (the composition of
the top 14 law schools in the U.S. News rankings has not changed in 20 years).”) [hereinafter Henderson, Job Market]. BigLaw’s narrow focus on these criteria has recently come
under criticism as an inadequate predictor of practice success in a BigLaw context, but
they nevertheless remain predominant. See, e.g., Theodore P. Seto, Where Do Partners
Come From?, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 242 (2012); Robert Anderson, A Last Word on the Seto
Rankings, WITNESSETH: L., DEALS, & DATA (Dec. 23, 2012, 5:26 AM),
http://witnesseth.typepad.com/blog/2012/12/a-last-word-on-the-seto-rankings.html; William
Henderson, A Reply to the Empiricists at NWU Law, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Mar. 17, 2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2012/03/a-reply-to-the-empiricists-atnwu-law.html; William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Pedigree Problem: Are
Law School Ties Choking the Profession?, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2012, 5:20 AM CDT),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_pedigree_problem_are_law_school_ties_ch
oking_the_profession/; Bill Henderson, “Too Good for BigLaw”: The Statistician Edition,
LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Mar. 9, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/
2012/03/too-good-for-biglaw-the-statistician-edition.html; see also Henderson, Job Market,
supra, at 21.
74. Obviously not all of the most employable graduates start out in BigLaw. Appreciable numbers have specific practice interests, political orientations, or personal preferences that they consider inconsistent with a BigLaw practice, and thus prefer positions in
nonprofits, government, business, or smaller firms. Nor is this observation intended as an
endorsement of the view accepted in some quarters that BigLaw jobs are “better” in any
meaningful sense than other Law Jobs, other than that they generally pay more. But it is
reasonably descriptive to generalize that many graduates who can get what is still called a
partnership-track job in BigLaw do, and that those who do bear credentials that would be
among the most attractive to most other employers. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY,
TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 24, 55-57, 104-05,
110-11 (1991); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law
Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 589-92 (1989);
Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives
on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 431, 476-77 (1989); Nick Brown, Firms’
‘Ego’-Driven Salary Structure Can’t Last: Experts, LAW360 (Oct. 2, 2009, 2:30 PM),
http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/125954/firms-ego-driven-salary-structure-can-tlast-experts; see also supra note 73 and authorities cited therein.
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erally occupied that next-most-sought-after tranche of jobs, and so on
down the line, until the least employable candidates, who generally
occupied the least-sought-after Law Jobs, get pushed out of Law Jobs
altogether into less- or non-law-related positions or unemployment. 75
In sum, the recent contractions in the entry-level Law Job market
have occurred disproportionately among larger law firms. In addition,
the candidates who previously would have obtained BigLaw positions,
but because of its recently constricted hiring now cannot, end up employed in Law Jobs that would have been held by other candidates
but for BigLaw’s contraction. As a result, reductions in BigLaw hiring affect hiring prospects for almost all law graduates, influencing
the types of jobs most are likely to obtain and making some less likely to obtain any Law Job at all.
V. HOW NORMAL IS THE NEW NORMAL LIKELY TO BE?
If, as the analysis to this point has suggested, changes in BigLaw’s
hiring practices account for a disproportionate share of the changes
in the entry-level employment market as a whole, then predicting
BigLaw hiring into the future should provide valuable insight into
the quantity and nature of the Law Jobs that will be available to new
graduates in coming years. This Part attempts to do so in at least
some rough proportions.
Demand for BigLaw’s services fell precipitously as the economy
contracted in 2008 and has remained depressed since. 76 There is no

75. Like the text accompanying the preceding footnote, this oversimplifies: Not every
employer or type of employer applies identical hiring criteria, or applies them in the same
way. But the predominance of school prestige and class standing as criteria across the
market should make generalization along these lines descriptive enough to be meaningful.
76. The total number of attorneys in the NLJ 250 decreased 4% in 2009, and another
1.1% in 2010, only the second period since the National Law Journal started compiling
these statistics in 1979 that total headcount has decreased in two consecutive years (the
other was a 1% and a 0.9% decrease during the recession in the early 1990s). Most of those
laid off were associates and other nonpartners—roughly 9% of the headcount in each of
those categories in 2009 alone. Though about two-thirds of the 2009 losses in the “other”
category were recouped in 2010, associate headcount in the NLJ 250 fell another 1.5% in
2010. Leigh Jones, Jump in the Number of ‘Other’ Attorneys at NLJ 250 Firms, NAT’L L.J.
(Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202474763926; Leigh
Jones, So Long, Farewell: For Attorney Headcount, 2009 Worst Year in Three Decades, Survey Shows, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=
1202435311650; Leigh Jones, Vanishing Act: Year II, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202474471365. Lawyer headcount at larger firms
rose 1-2% in 2012 and less than 1% in 2013, though the largest firms tended to grow a little
more rapidly. Dan DiPietro & Gretta Rusanow, Citi: Firms Posted 4.3 Percent Rise in 2012
Profits, AM. LAW. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202587253629/
Citi%3A-Firms-Posted-4.3-Percent-Rise-in-2012-Profits; Sara Randazzo, Yet Another Warning for Law Firms That Major Change Is Afoot, AM. LAW. (Feb. 4, 2013),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202586968705/Yet-Another-Warning-for-Law-FirmsThat-Major-Change-Is-Afoot; Gretta Rusanow & Dan DiPietro, Citi Report: Firms Saw
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serious argument that BigLaw hiring will recover unless demand for
its services does, and the longer that takes, the longer hiring will remain depressed on any theory. To the extent that the widespread belief is correct that the economic recovery that is hopefully beginning
as this Article is written will be unusually slow and gradual, there
would appear to be little reason for optimism in the near term. 77
Modest Growth in 2013, AM. LAW. (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=
1202641665337/Citi-Report%3A-Firms-Saw-Modest-Growth-in-2013.
Even after these unprecedented reductions in force, demand for legal services
continued to fall on average 0.4% per year between 2008 and 2012. CITI PRIVATE BANK &
HILDEBRANDT CONSULTING LLC, 2013 CLIENT ADVISORY 2 (2013), available at
http://hildebrandtconsult.com/uploads/Citi_Hildebrandt_2013_Client_Advisory.pdf. The number of hours billed per remaining attorney—a colorable if imperfect proxy for demand for
BigLaw’s services because it is an indication of how much personnel were called upon to
work—fell by over 100 hours per attorney per year between 2007 and 2008 (down 6% from
2007, in addition to the 5.4% of all attorneys who were laid off and thus reduced their
hours to 0), and has stayed near those reduced levels since. Id. at 3; Sara Randazzo, Report:
The Boom Years Are Not Coming Back, Get Used to It, AM. LAW. (Jan. 13, 2013),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202584230190/Report%3A-The-Boom-Years-Are-NotComing-Back%2C-Get-Used-to-It. Demand grew only 0.2-0.5% for larger firms in 2012.
DiPietro & Rusanow, supra; Randazzo, Yet Another Warning, supra (“The Georgetown-Peer
Monitor study also found that demand for legal services increased just 0.5 percent last year,
based on the number of billable hours logged by firms that report to Peer Monitor. Labor
and employment lawyers saw the biggest increase in demand, 4.1 percent, while litigators’
were off slightly and corporate lawyers racked up 1.2 percent more billable hours.”). Larger
firms remained stagnant in 2013. While the two dozen or so most profitable firms in the
nation improved modestly (mid-single digits) in revenue and profits in 2013, the Am Law
100 (the 100 most profitable large firms in the country) overall saw average revenue per
lawyer fall 0.4% while profits per partner grew 0.2%. David Lat, The 2014 Am Law 100:
‘The Super Rich Get Richer,’ ABOVE THE L. (Apr. 28, 2014, 3:46 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/04/the-2014-am-law-100-the-super-rich-get-richer. More broadly
among larger firms, demand was down 0.4% again in 2013, with very modest (low singledigit) increases in profits per partner and gross revenue. Rusanow & DiPietro, supra; see
also Aric Press, For Attorneys, It’s the Season for Collecting, AM. LAW. (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202628538271/For-Attorneys,-It's-the-Season-forCollecting- (summarizing recent industry studies showing continuing slow demand); Lisa
Shuchman, Companies Expect More Litigation, Less Spending in 2014, CORP. COUNS. (Sept.
12,
2013),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202618917112?slreturn=20140227172125
(same, but noting IP litigation as a potential growth area). Wells Fargo Private Bank’s
Legal Specialty Group reported larger firms’ hours down about 2.5% in the first half of
2013. One-third of partners were billing at a rate below 1400 hours per year, raising the
possibility of further partner de-equitization and dismissal. Sara Randazzo, Bank Says
Firms on Track for Anemic Growth in 2013, AM. LAW. (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202614521189.
77. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Cautious on Growth, Bernanke Offers No Hint of New
Action, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/business/economy/
bernanke-testifies-before-senate-panel.html?smid=pl-share; Timothy F. Geithner, Op-Ed.,
Welcome to the Recovery, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/
03/opinion/03geithner.html (“[E]conomic growth will come slower than we would like.”);
Kaitlyn Kiernan, Stocks Start ’14 Nursing Hangover, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303870704579297800065669192
(quoting Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke: “The headwinds I have mentioned may now
be abating. . . . The aftereffects of the housing bust also appear to have waned. . . . [But]
recovery clearly remains incomplete.”); Floyd Norris, Most G-7 Nations Still Trying to Recoup Lost Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19/business/
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But what is likely to happen to entry-level law hiring assuming
that demand for the kind of complex, premium-priced legal services
BigLaw has traditionally provided 78 eventually returns to prerecession levels? 79 There are, broadly speaking, two schools of thought.
One hypothesis holds that the current shortfalls in hiring are
grounded predominantly in the cyclically depressed demand for
BigLaw services resulting from the Great Recession. On this theory,
entry-level hiring in BigLaw and elsewhere should return to prerecession levels as the economy improves. The other hypothesis holds
that the current shortfalls in hiring are grounded predominantly in
structural changes in the way that complex legal services are produced, staffed, and priced. On this theory, recovering demand should
have only a limited effect on hiring, and entry-level employment
should remain depressed from prerecession levels for many years
to come.
These theories yield very different predictions about the course
and scope of the market for new lawyers, and probably for more
experienced lawyers as well. The following sections test their relative
plausibility.

economy/most-g-7-economies-still-struggling-to-recoup-lost-jobs.html (quoting Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen: “The recovery in the labor market has been exceptionally slow.”).
The effect on legal hiring in particular is likely to be retarded further by the “overhang” of
thousands of highly credentialed younger lawyers laid off from BigLaw in 2009 and 2010,
as well as the additional thousands of excess unemployed and underemployed who graduated in recent years, and who will be competing with new law graduates for some years to
come.
78. Throughout this Article, the modifiers “complex,” “high-end,” “premium-priced,”
and “BigLaw” will be used interchangeably to refer to the general range of services BigLaw
has traditionally provided.
79. There are thoughtful commentators who believe that legal services in the forms
traditionally provided across the market for such services are doomed to extinction by
technological innovation and changes in consumer habits in the Information Age. See, e.g.,
RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES
(2008). These innovations would be highly disruptive if not transformative of the structure
and pricing of most legal services, and very likely would significantly reduce demand for
services from producers in the BigLaw model, particularly to the extent those services are
provided by entry-level lawyers. A full consideration of these provocative and interesting
ideas is well beyond the scope of this Article, but the author believes that their proponents
are at the very least overoptimistic as to the rate at which these innovations will emerge
and transform both producer and consumer behavior. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC. 1 (2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1567712 (describing infrastructural
impediments to possible technological and conventional innovations in the form and production of law and legal services). This Article thus assumes that (other than the effect of
certain technological innovations on legal process work discussed infra Part V.A–B, if that
is within the scope of what these futurists predict) these forces will have only limited effect
for the foreseeable future—measured at, say, ten to fifteen years.
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A. Arguments Favoring a Cyclical, Demand-Based View of the
Forces Driving Entry-Level Legal Hiring
To the extent they are data-based, arguments for a cyclical view of
the current state of the Law-Job market generally reason inductively
from past patterns to future events. Adherents point out that, since
at least the 1970s, BigLaw hiring has been (subject to modest cyclical
fluctuation) fairly consistently robust, with growth rates in BigLaw
overall of 8% per year or more. 80 As Figure 4-A shows, entry-level
BigLaw hiring dipped contemporaneously with the past recessions of
the early 2000s and early 1990s (and as Figure 1 suggests, likely did
the same during the Reagan Recession of the early 1980s), and in
each case returned to its prior accelerating levels. This recession, the
argument goes, is more severe than prior ones, but all that should
mean is that the dip in hiring has been deeper, and the recovery will
take longer, than in prior years. 81 In fact, the Law Jobs Ratio calculated here, as well as the absolute number of Law Jobs, has already
begun to increase slightly. Adherents to this view believe these developments demonstrate its merit. 82
B. Arguments Favoring a Structural View of the Forces
Driving Entry-Level Hiring
Those favoring a structural view cite changing circumstances especially salient to BigLaw that, they contend, are likely to change the
way that complex legal services are staffed and priced long-term.
These include the following:

80. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson, Of Tournaments and Transformations: Explaining the
Growth of Large Law Firms, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 733, 736 (reviewing MARC GALANTER &
THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM
(1991)).
81. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Debating, Yet Again, the Worth of Law School,
DEALBOOK – N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013, 11:44 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
07/18/debating-yet-again-the-worth-of-law-school/?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y (“To be sure, the
job market for lawyers has historically been a cyclical [sic], and it is currently at a low. . . .
The market may recover, as markets tend to do and as the population grows. There may
even be more legal jobs . . . .” However, the author also acknowledges the possibility that
“the current figures represent the new normal . . . .”); Barros, supra note 2, at 11 (“In both
booms and busts, there is a tendency to talk as if the current situation will be permanent. . . . I think we need to be very careful in both booms and busts not to become overly
convinced that our current situation is the result of permanent change.”); Diamond, supra
note 2 (citing “trends over many decades where legal employment responds cyclically to the
macroeconomy”); Mitchell, supra note 2 (“[A] little historical perspective will reveal that
the law job market has been bad—very bad—before.”).
82. See Diamond, supra note 2; Karen Sloan, Large Firms in a Hiring Mood Again,
NAT’L L.J. (June 24, 2013), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202607980312/LargeFirms-in-a-Hiring-Mood-Again-; supra Figure 1.
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1. Pressure on Premium Pricing for Legal Process Work
As the advent of email and widely available electronic data storage multiplied the volume of durable information potentially relevant
to transactions and disputes, the gathering and organization of documents and information (referred to with increasing frequency as
“legal process” work) became a larger and larger portion of the services for which BigLaw charged. 83 BigLaw offered highly credentialed
but inexperienced junior associates at high hourly billing rates for
this work; “leveraged” service structures, featuring larger and larger
numbers of associates per partner spending greater and greater proportions of their time doing more menial and less supervised work,
were increasingly important to BigLaw profitability in the 1990s and
2000s. 84 The portions of each graduating class lured into this service
model by generous and continually escalating starting salaries increased for many years. 85 Figures 4 and 5 show the portion of the aggregate graduating class entering BigLaw over time.
But clients grew increasingly restive about paying what became
$250 or more per hour for what often amounted to legally literate
clerical work. 86 Recession-induced budget cuts suddenly imposed on
in-house law departments forced more clients to rethink this pricing
structure at the same time as large-scale layoffs and hiring deferments in BigLaw created an army of credentialed and skilled labor
83. See, e.g., Burk & McGowan, supra note 4, at 80-85; Montgomery Kosma, As M&A
Heats Up, Expect Antitrust Reviews, RECORDER (CAL.) (Feb. 5, 2010),
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202442014957 (“[D]ocument review can account for more
than 75 percent of the cost in a merger investigation . . . .”).
84. See Henderson & Zaring, supra note 7, at 1096-1104 (including the startling empirical finding of a negative correlation between work that associates characterized as interesting and firm profitability). On leverage (the ratio of associates and other nonpartners
to partners), see, for example, William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier
Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1714 tbl.1, 1728
tbl.6 (2006) (describing that by 2003, median leverage in the AmLaw 200 was 3.5:1, with
4:1 at the 75th percentile) [hereinafter Henderson, Single vs. Two-Tier Partnerships]; Steven Harper, Permanent Leverage, AM L. DAILY (Nov. 12, 2010, 5:10 PM),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/11/permanentleverage.html
(discussing
recent erosion of the traditional BigLaw profitability model based on leverage).
85. See Bill Henderson, How the “Cravath System” Created the Bi-Modal Distribution,
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (July 18, 2008, 2:14 AM), http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_
legal_studi/2008/07/how-the-cravath.html; Leigh Jones, For Law Firm Associates, It’s Been
a Decade of Thrills and Chills, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202437225554 [hereinafter Jones, Thrills & Chills].
86. Typical large-firm associate rates rose about 75% between 1997 and 2007, and
over 130% between 1997 and 2013. (Source: Comparing average high and low associate
rates for firms participating in the National Law Journal Billing Survey in 1997, 2007, and
2013. The NLJ Billing Survey reports are proprietary and on file with the author.) By 2007,
many large firms were charging $250 per hour or more for inexperienced new law graduates. Firms Report Their Billing Rates by Associate Class, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1197281081525 (2007 associate billing rates by class).
Regarding client insistence on legal process cost control, see infra note 90.
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willing to perform these services for a fraction of the pay commanded
by BigLaw associates.87 Contemporaneously, technology began to allow document review and information organization to be seamlessly
performed from multiple remote locations. These developments
fueled the rapid expansion of legal process outsourcing firms such as
Pangea3 and others, operating both abroad and domestically. 88 As of
2012, legal process outsourcing had become a $2.4 billion industry
worldwide and was growing at 28% per year.89 These events have also inspired BigLaw to respond to the competition from outsourcers
and to clients’ demands to slash legal process costs by starting their
own internal legal process functions, staffed by less-credentialed contract and “staff” lawyers at much lower salaries and billing rates, a
process referred to as “downsourcing.” 90 More recently, technological
innovation in the form of “predictive coding”—proprietary software
that is becoming increasingly effective at reducing the number of
documents that require human review for responsiveness and privilege—is reducing the personnel needed for legal process work. 91
87. See Erin Marie Daly, Weak Economy Slows Litigation Growth, LAW360 (Jan. 4,
2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/141372; Elie Mystal, In-House Counsel Don’t Intend
to Give You Hours, ABOVE THE L. (June 1, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/
in-house-counsel-dont-intend-to-give-you-hours; Karen Sloan, For Litigators, a Different
Kind of Recession, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?
id =1202433112312.
88. See Rhys Blakely & Alex Spence, Brief for India’s Outsourcing Lawyers: Keep It
Cheap, TIMES (Jan. 15, 2010), http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_
sectors/support_services/article6988773.ece; Debra Cassens Weiss, Want to Outsource Legal Work? Ohio Can Be as Cheap as India, Report Says, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 12, 2011, 5:30 AM
CST), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/want_to_hire_an_outsourced_lawyer_ohio_
can_be_as_cheap_as_india_report_says/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=weekly_email.
89. See Mary Cecelia Lacity & Leslie P. Willcocks, Survey of IT Outsourcing Experiences in US and UK Organizations, J. GLOBAL INFO. MGMT., Apr.–June 2000, at 5; Leigh
Jones, The Old Rules No Longer Apply on the NLJ 350, NAT’L L.J. (June 10, 2013)
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202603399812&The_Old_Rules_No_
Longer_Apply_on_The_NLJ_350 [hereinafter cited as Jones, Old Rules].
90. See Jocelyn Allison, Firms Roll Out 5 Cost-Cutting Strategies for 2010, LAW360
(Jan. 2, 2010, 5:37 PM), http://ip.law360.com/articles/139219 (“If law firms want to keep
[legal process] work, they’re either going to have to outsource it themselves or create some
department or division of their firm that can do more of those routine tasks at a lower
rate.”); Jocelyn Allison, Temp Attorneys Boon for Some, Liability for Others, LAW360 (May
14, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/web/articles/101669 (“[A]n overall increase in
the demand for temporary attorneys [has been seen] in recent years in part because of the
sheer volume of document review needed in the age of electronic discovery and because of
the value.”); Liz McKenzie, Contract Attys Sitting Pretty as Associates Deferred, LAW360
(Feb. 9, 2010, 2:58 PM), http://www.law360.com/web/articles/148068 (“Clients are looking
to firms to perform solutions for cost control, and one of those is using contract attorneys
for lower-level work. . . . More and more clients are saying if you can’t figure out how to get
lower-level work done at lower rates, then we’ll find a way to do it ourselves.”); see also
supra note 69 (citing sources documenting increasing use by larger firms of permanent
staff attorneys for legal process and similar work).
91. Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in E-

584

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:541

Because a substantial number of the junior partnership-track associates in BigLaw had spent increasing portions of their time doing
the legal process work for which they were finally being priced out of
the market, associate layoffs, deferred start dates, and reduced entrylevel hiring goals in BigLaw were expected results of these forces.
And there is no reason to expect any of these phenomena to do anything other than accelerate. Clients who know they can pay 30% to
90% less for their legal process work will never again allow outside
counsel to charge them more. 92 Increasing client willingness to disaggregate legal process work from more complex pieces of a case or
deal and treat it as a commodity service will result in even greater
price competition and pressure on margins.93 So will continuing innovation and improvement in predictive coding and similar natural
language and artificial intelligence technologies designed to limit the
human effort in document and information gathering and review. 94
In short, these forces driving down the need for entry-level hiring
in BigLaw are already entrenched and should gather momentum in
coming years as their influence spreads. They seem likely to depress
entry-level BigLaw hiring for the foreseeable future.
2. Outsourcing, Downsourcing, and Insourcing
As just discussed, the growth of inexpensive outsourcing for legal
process work is leading to BigLaw’s competitive response: the
downsourcing within BigLaw firms of legal process and other repetiDiscovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-4 (2011); Panel Discussion: Judge Peck, Da Silva Moore and the
Outlook for Predictive Coding, METRO. CORP. COUNS., June 2012, at 8; see also Herbert L.
Roitblat, Anne Kershaw & Patrick Oot, Document Categorization in Legal Electronic Discovery: Computer Classification vs. Manual Review, 61 J. AM. SOC. FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH.
70 (2010).
92. Heather Timmons, Outsourcing to India Draws Western Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/business/global/05legal.html (“Thanks to
India’s low wages and costs and a big pool of young, English-speaking lawyers, outsourcing
firms charge from one-tenth to one-third what a Western law firm bills an hour.”); Debra
Cassens Weiss, Lawyer’s Lament: Pressure to Review 80 Docs an Hour, for $23 an Hour,
A.B.A. J. (Oct. 21, 2009, 7:52 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
lawyers_lament_pressure_to_review_80_docs_an_hour_for_23_an_hour; Down in the Data
Mines, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1, 2008, 7:40 PM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/down_in_the_data_mines/ (reporting on a contract lawyer doing document review
for $35 per hour); Weiss, supra note 88 (“Contract lawyers in the Midwest are charging $25
to $30 an hour . . . .”).
93. See sources cited supra note 92.
94. See sources cited supra note 91; see also Barry Murphy, Is Predictive Coding the
Future of Document Review?, E-DISCOVERY J. (Oct. 28, 2010, 11:56 PM),
http://ediscoveryjournal.com/2010/10/is-predictive-coding-the-future-of-document-review;
Andrew Peck, Search, Forward: Will Manual Document Review and Keyword Searches Be
Replaced
by
Computer-Assisted
Coding?,
L.
TECH.
NEWS
(Oct.
2011),
http://www.recommind.com/sites/default/files/LTN_Search_Forward_Peck_Recommind.pdf.
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tive work to much lower-paid and much lower-rate contract and staff
attorneys, rather than highly compensated, high-rate junior associates. 95 Also growing in prevalence is more discriminating judgment
on the part of in-house counsel about whether to buy certain recurring services from outside counsel or low-cost outsourcers, or to generate them in-house by hiring more lawyers and paralegals. 96
Many companies have found that it is more efficient and reliable,
and less expensive, to develop a relationship with an outsourcing
company, collaborate directly with the company on some projects,
and require outside counsel to work with the outsourcer and in-house
counsel on others. 97 General counsel may also elect to develop inhouse expertise for recurring work, such as common types of litigation or more routine licensing issues. Similarly, in-house professionals are increasingly handling recurrent legal process tasks, such as
tracking the company’s organizational structure and understanding
its archiving systems and information technology architecture in order to implement document “holds” required by incipient or pending
litigation or regulatory action, and to determine where and from
whom needed documents and information can be gathered. 98 This
“insourcing” moves tasks that previously were often handled by junior associates from outside counsel’s billing and purview back to the
client company.

95. See supra notes 69, 71, and accompanying text.
96. See Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497 (2008); Q&A with FMC Technologies GC Jeffrey Carr, LAW360
(Mar. 30, 2010, 5:19 PM), http://www.law360.com/web/articles/157416 (“Since we are always less expensive than outside counsel, we do a make-or-buy on all legal issues—asking
ourselves do we have the capacity (time) and the capability (expertise) to handle the matter.
Only if the answer to both of those questions is ‘no’ do we go outside.”).
97. See, e.g., Alex Aldridge, Tech Lawyers Say ‘Uh Oh’ As Microsoft Outsources Legal
Work to India, LAW.COM (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id
=1202444082821 (“Microsoft has been outsourcing basic intellectual property (IP) and patent renewal work to [legal outsourcing provider CPA Global] for five years, using a team of
about 70 CPA staff,” and now is expanding the services to include other legal research;
other large companies, such as global mining giant Rio Tinto, use similar services.);
Blakely & Spence, supra note 88; John Wang, E-Discovery Moves In House, RECORDER
(CAL.) (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.therecorder.com/ id=1202477740398/E-Discovery-MovesIn-House (growing proportions of client companies are bringing some or all of their ediscovery work in-house); Kosma, supra note 83 (“One way that major corporations are
starting to handle increasing regulatory burdens is to keep their outside counsel focused on
high-complexity legal questions, while augmenting their team with outsourcing specialists
who have expertise in managing high-volume, document-intensive analysis and synthesis
tasks.”).
98. See George P. Baker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and the Careers of Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1654-55 (2006) (discussing
growth in size and scope of in-house law departments in the late 1990s and early 2000s);
Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The
Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2142-44 (2010); see also
Schwarcz, supra note 96.
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All of these practices appear to be grounded in sound judgments
about reducing the cost of complex legal services over the long haul.
All of them reduce the need for BigLaw firms to have junior associates on hand, and thus depress demand for such positions.
3. Other Pressure on the Use of Junior Associates
As the rates charged for junior associate work increased, clients
became increasingly unhappy with its cost and the extent to which,
as they put it, they were paying for the junior lawyers’ training. 99 Entry-level lawyers became more and more widely viewed (with, sad to
say, some justification) as unskilled and inefficient. Growing numbers of clients started refusing outright to pay for any first- or second-year associate time. 100 A 2010 survey of in-house lawyers conducted by the Association of Corporate Counsel showed that 63% of
those responding—compared with 20% in 2003—had minimum seniority requirements for the associates assigned to their matters by
outside counsel. 101

99. Mike France, Dilemma: Who Will Teach Associates? Squeezed by Their Clients’
Unwillingness to Subsidize Training, Firms Seek Alternatives, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 20, 1995, at
8 (“Clients used to be willing to pay for the time lawyers spent reading introductory treatises about unfamiliar subjects, but many large corporations now explicitly tell partners
that they refuse to pay for any training time. At the same time, increased pressure to bill
hours is robbing attorneys of the time that used to be devoted to activities such as continuing education seminars and one-on-one partner-associate mentoring.”); Shannon Henson,
Change May Be Coming to Law Firm Staffing Models, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2009, 3:55 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/135593; Elie Mystal, Corporate General Counsel Puts Fear
of God into Legal Educators (And You Should Be Worried Too), ABOVE THE L. (Apr. 9, 2010,
6:08 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/04/corporate-general-counsel-puts-fear-of-god-intolegal-educators-and-you-should-be-worried-too/; Jones, Thrills & Chills, supra note 85; see
also infra note 100.
100. Esther Lardent, Solving the Professional Development Puzzle, NAT’L L.J. (Mar.
28, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202547220793/Solving-the-professionaldevelopment-puzzle- (“More and more corporate clients are refusing to compensate their
outside law firms for the time of young associates assigned to their matters. . . . [Associates]
can’t do the work without experience, and they can’t gain experience without the work. . . .
The era of simply learning on the job is over.”); Aric Press, How the Am Law 100 Makes Its
Money: Client Demand for Am Law 100 Hours Dipped Last Year Even as Invoiced Rates
Jumped, AM. LAW. (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?
id=1202596738495&slreturn=20130603175302 (“Clients have been noisily demanding that
firms not assign junior associates to their matters.”); Debra Cassens Weiss, Nixon Peabody
Hiring Partner: Student Recruitment Model Is ‘Antiquated,’ A.B.A. J. (Oct. 5, 2009, 9:58
AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/nixon_peabody_hiring_partner_student
_recruitment_model_is_antiquated (quoting Nixon Peabody hiring partner John Snellings:
“If a young lawyer can’t work on a matter because their rates are too high—how do we get
them the training they need?”).
101. Lardent, supra note 100; see also Jones, Old Rules, supra note 88; Claire Zillman,
Law Firm Leaders Survey 2010: The New Normal, AM. LAW., Dec. 1, 2010, at 66 (stating
that by 2010, nearly half of the AmLaw 200 firms had clients that refused to pay for the
work of first- or second-year associates).

2014]

THE NEW NORMAL

587

Once again, there is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse in the absence of serious price reductions for junior associates’
time (which would require a radical retooling of the economics of junior associate positions, including drastic salary reductions to support
the lower rates and substantially increased firm expenditures on
nonbillable training). 102 The fewer the clients that will tolerate entrylevel lawyers on their bills, the fewer such lawyers any firm can sensibly hire. This trend is also a structural impediment to increased
entry-level hiring going forward.
4. The Disappearance of the Partnership Track
The paradigm BigLaw model of hiring and promotion was the
“Cravath System,” developed (so the legend goes) by Paul Cravath in
the 1920s at what became Cravath, Swaine & Moore, and widely emulated since. It involved the recruitment and training of a “class” of
highly qualified associates each year selected from the cream of the
most elite law schools, who were rigorously trained and provided
with graduating levels of responsibility until, after a fixed period of
years, a very small number of those remaining were elevated to partner. 103 Those “passed over” understood they were expected to leave
the firm and often received assistance from the partners in locating
other employment. 104 Growth in the partnership came almost entirely
from internal promotion; lateral movement of partners was very rare
until the 1970s. 105
This “up or out” promotion and retention model, which became
pervasive in BigLaw, was difficult to justify. Why should a firm invest substantial resources in training and acculturating new lawyers,
and introduce them to institutional clients, knowing that the vast
majority of them—including many who were well-liked by and useful
to the firm’s partners and clients—would leave? As the circumstances
that allowed the BigLaw style of promotional tournament to create
any value—for example, strongly institutionalized clients and rigorous personal training and acculturation based on unique firm prac102. A few larger firms have begun to experiment with “apprenticeship” programs that
devote significant parts of their associates’ first two years to training, with substantially
reduced billable-hour requirements and salary, and a developing curriculum of skills instruction. Whether these experiments will ultimately generate any widespread practices
or results is impossible to predict. See Jeff Jeffrey, For Some Firms, An Extra Step for
the Newest Recruits, NAT’L L.J., June 29, 2009, at 1; Julie Triedman, Associate Pay Cuts
Here to Stay, Say Firms, Analysts, AM. LAW. (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1202436246170.
103. 2 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819–1948, at 212 (1948); GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 74, at 9, 14-15.
104. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 74, at 28-29.
105. Id. at 23-24; ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 259 (Midland Book ed.
1969).
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tices and knowhow—became less and less common, the value of the
policy eroded. 106 By the 1990s, firms were confronted with larger and
larger entering classes that they were obligated to recruit, train, and
support at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars per person, virtually all of whom were gone within a few years.107
Partnership tracks gradually grew longer and more flexible,
and in most instances have lost their fixed endpoint altogether. 108
Ninety-two percent of large-firm managing partners responding to
a 2013 survey reported that they no longer had an “up or out”
promotion policy. 109
The late 1980s saw the high-water mark for associates as a percentage of all lawyers in BigLaw. From there, associates continued to
increase in number, but comprised a falling percentage of lawyer
census overall, with the principal percentage gains in the category
delicately referred to as “other” (the non-equity-partner, nonassociates referred to variously as “non-equity,” “service,” or “income”
106. The most plausible explanation for the widespread “up or out” promotion practices
that historically prevailed in BigLaw is offered in Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 74. In
briefest possible overview, Gilson and Mnookin suggest that “up or out” is a “bonding
mechanism” that protects partners and associates in a pre-1980s Cravath-style firm from
opportunistic behavior by either with respect to the “firm-specific capital” (that is,
knowledge and connections much more valuable at that firm than they would be anywhere
else, for example relating to the firm’s institutional clients) that associates would acquire
during their tenure at such a firm. As the circumstances conducive to the creation of firmspecific human capital by associates erode, the risk of opportunistic behavior is likewise
mitigated, and more associates become happier with the prospect of being kept on as longterm nonpartner employees. Id.; see Burk & McGowan, supra note 4, at 16-19, 54-55.
107. See, e.g., Michael D. Goldhaber, National Law Firms Wage a War of Attrition:
Some Grew, Some Shrank, but the Real Game Was Turnover, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1999,
at 16 (“The current consensus figure for the hard cost of losing a midlevel associate is
$200,000 to $250,000 . . . .”); Kristin K. Stark & Blane Prescott, Why Associates Leave: Special Report, LEGAL TIMES, May 7, 2007, at 45 (Each associate departure costs a firm “an
estimated $200,000 to $500,000 connected to original recruiting costs, sunken training and
development costs, resource shortage and replacement costs, administrative and human
resource costs, and other factors.”); Peter D. Zeughauser, Time to Buckle Up? When a
Firm’s Lawyers Are Eyeing the Exits, Can Silver Seatbelts Keep Them Strapped In?, AM.
LAW., Sept. 1999, at 41 (citing the 1994 NALP Report that “46 percent of 1994 law school
graduates left the firms that they entered directly out of law school after three years or
less”); see also Steven Harper, Misery Index as a New Law Firm Metric?, AM. LAW. (Apr. 15,
2011), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/ 2011/04/harper040711.html (“NALP’s
last report — before the 2008 financial crisis — showed big law’s five-year associate attrition rates skyrocketing to more than 80 percent, but significant differences existed among
firms.”).
108. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1877-80, 1906 (2008); Baker &
Parkin, supra note 98, at 1670-71 (documenting rising partnership track length (to nearly
ten years) and falling promotion rates (to around 5%) in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
with variation among geographic markets); Henderson, Single vs. Two-Tier Partnerships,
supra note 84, at 1709-13.
109. THOMAS S. CLAY, ALTMAN WEIL, INC., 2013 LAW FIRMS IN TRANSITION iii, 19
(2013), available at http://www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/2d831a80-8156-49479f0f-1d97eec632a5_document.pdf.
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partners or as “senior associates,” “counsel,” and the like). 110 Associates were 60.2% of large-firm lawyers in 1987, 55% in 2001, 48% in
2010, and 47% in 2012.111 What this change appears to reflect as a
practical matter is an effort to reduce the expenses of training that
clients were increasingly reluctant to underwrite, and the
deadweight losses of personnel attrition and turnover, by keeping
110. See Baker & Parkin, supra note 98, at 1673-75 (empirically analyzing apparent
erosion of “up or out” practices in BigLaw during late 1990s and early 2000s); Michael
Allen, The Of-Counsel Carousel, ABOVE THE L. (Aug. 8, 2013, 11:12 AM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/08/the-of-counsel-carousel/#more-262893; Leigh Jones, NLJ
250 Records a New Low Point for Legal Associates, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202474693179 [hereinafter Jones, Low
Point]; Checked Your Demographics Lately?, ADAM SMITH, ESQ. (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.adamsmithesq.com/2013/08/checked-your-demographics-lately/?single (reporting that among NLJ 250 firms between the years 2002–2012, equity partners grew by 2%,
while non-equity partners grew by 112%).
111. Jones, Low Point, supra note 110; see also WILLIAM HENDERSON & EVAN PARKERSTEPHEN, LAWYER METRICS, THE DIAMOND LAW FIRM: A NEW MODEL OR THE PYRAMID
UNRAVELING? (2013), available at http://lawyermetrics.com/downloads/20131203_
Henderson.pdf; Leigh Jones, Jump in the Number of ‘Other’ Attorneys at NLJ 250 Firms,
L.J.
(Nov.
11,
2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
NAT’L
1202474763926; The NLJ 350: Our Annual Survey of the Nation’s Largest Law Firms,
NAT’L L.J.
(June
10,
2013),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202603325795 (source for the data from which the 2012 statistic in the text is derived).
One striking feature of the distribution of associates in BigLaw is that bigger firms tend to
have greater proportions of associates in their attorney census:
Rank by Headcount

% Associates

1 to 50

55%

51 to 100

44%

101 to 150

40%

151 to 200

34%

201 to 250

34%

251 to 300

39%

301 to 350

32%

(Source: Derived from data in The NLJ 350, supra.) A quantitatively grounded explanation
for this distribution is beyond the scope of this Article, but one possible explanation is that
larger big firms have historically tended to maintain greater associate-to-partner ratios
and to bill disproportionately greater portions of their professional time to more highly
leveraged, heavily staffed matters; thus their proportion of associates started higher, and is
falling more slowly, than smaller big firms. Another possibility is that larger big firms tend
to have longer (or more-indeterminate-length) partnership tracks (to the extent such
“tracks” exist as such these days, see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text), so as a
practical matter more associates stay longer before either leaving or moving into a differently denominated role. Yet another possibility is that there are nomenclature issues, with
different firms calling greater numbers of non-partners “associates” even when there is no
particular time at which they might be considered for promotion to any position denominated “partner” (equity or otherwise). The question bears further examination for those
interested in the evolution of the large law firm.
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more people on for a longer time. The approach also provides clients
with more of what they are asking for by increasing the inventory of
more experienced (and thus more knowledgeable and efficient) lawyers available to handle their work.112
Once again, there is no discernible reason for the BigLaw firms
that are quietly abandoning the custom to return to the churning expense of huge entering classes winnowed to almost nothing by “up or
out” attrition. The much more interesting question is why the practice has lasted as long as it has even in its eroding form, and why it
persists to any degree today. But the more that a firm keeps more of
its hires for longer periods of time, the less it needs to hire new graduates at the front end of its less-rapidly-emptying pipeline. These
trends in retention practices, which appear grounded in sound business economics and thus are likely to hold if not increase in prevalence, further reduce any incentive or need for BigLaw to acquire entry-level lawyers. 113
112. William Henderson and Evan Parker-Stephen argue in a recent monograph that
this demographic change does not reflect a new sustainable model for the large law firm,
but rather is merely “the shape of the [traditional leveraged BigLaw “pyramid” structure]
as it unravels.” HENDERSON & PARKER-STEPHEN, supra note 111, at 4. This author respectfully disagrees. While the new diamond-shaped structure taking hold in BigLaw (fewer
entry-level hires; more and more lawyers at middle levels of seniority, status, and compensation, and fewer true owners at the top) presents challenges in developing new strategies
for training and retention of more junior lawyers, it responds quite directly to the evolving
demands of BigLaw clients and firm management. Specifically, it provides reduced attrition and turnover costs, a greater concentration of more skilled and experienced lawyers to
perform the tasks clients need with less cost and inefficiency from on-the-job training, and
a continuing re-channeling of the profits of the enterprise from service workers to those
who bring law business to the firm. (The costs and benefits these changes visit on the various constituencies within a law firm are important and interesting, but beyond the scope of
this particular discussion; the only point made here is that they can be traced to evolving
market forces largely beyond the participants’ control.)
113. It is fair to ask why these phenomena’s effects emerged contemporaneously with
the recent recession if the changes in BigLaw really are predominantly structural and respond to forces that have been gathering for many years. One (and probably the best) answer may be that in fact they did not all emerge as the economy contracted, but were asserting themselves well before. William Henderson has documented what he describes as a
“stagnation” in overall legal employment in place by 2002 or 2003, which would be consistent with the earlier origins of all of the concerns discussed here. William D. Henderson
& Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job Stagnation May Have Started Before the Recession—And
It May Be a Sign of Lasting Change, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2011, 3:40 AM CST),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/paradigm_shift. Henderson and Zahorsky use
Census Bureau figures that encompass all law-firm workers, including nonlicensed personnel such as secretaries and paralegals as well as lawyers, so it is difficult to draw inferences regarding any changes in demand specifically for persons holding law degrees. For
example, the growing number of computer-literate lawyers willing to do much of their own
typing (rather than dictating or drafting in longhand as was typical in the twentieth century) has significantly reduced the demand for secretaries, typist/word processors and stenographers. See ALM LEGAL INTELLIGENCE, FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE: NON-ATTORNEY
STAFFING IN LAW FIRMS 13 (2012) (proprietary report on file with the author). We do know
that entry-level lawyer hiring continued to accelerate through 2008 (see supra Figures 1–2)
even as law firm attorney and staff employment overall declined. See Henderson & Za-
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C. So Which Is It, Cyclical or Structural?
Given the severity of the recent recession and the demonstrated
depression of the demand for BigLaw’s services that accompanied it,
it seems hard to deny that some of the falloff in entry-level hiring in
BigLaw is cyclical and will moderate as the economy improves. 114

horsky, supra. But that is not necessarily inconsistent with Henderson’s suggestion that
structural forces were exerting an observable drag on law firm growth and hiring well before the recession began.
As for those effects that did emerge most visibly contemporaneously with the recession, David McGowan and I explored some possible reasons for the conjunction in our
last inquiry about BigLaw:
The recession, with its widespread law-department budget cuts and thousands of large-firm layoffs, seems to have awakened everyone involved to the
forces that had been building for years, and brought those forces more fully into
play. Clients triaged their legal work and, as to what was indispensable, began
to scrutinize which constituent tasks truly needed high-end staffing and which
required not the “best,” but just those good enough to accomplish the task costeffectively. Law firms economized by shedding expensive associates whose services were no longer in demand at prevailing rates, instead spot-contracting
with foot-soldiers in the new army of the unemployed for legal process and similar work at much lower cost and more flexible commitment. Out-of-work associates often had few options other than lower-wage contract or staff attorney
positions, and legal process outsourcers had greater access to licensed lawyers
with legal process experience and a need for work. In short, the recession did
not create the technological and cost-structure changes that had been slowly
reshaping the market for legal services, but it did expose those changes in high
relief, redistribute the workforce involved in them, and accelerate the market’s
internalization of them.
Burk & McGowan, supra note 4, at 92; see id. at 90-92.
114. One circumstance specific to BigLaw not yet discussed is the sudden disappearance in 2008 and 2009 of the large amounts of securitization work that had over the prior
decade or so become a significant part of some larger firms’ practice diets when the products of that work became widely viewed as “toxic.” See, e.g., Nate Raymond, Cadwalader
Lays Off 96 More Lawyers, AM. LAW. (July 30, 2008), http://www.americanlawyer.com/
id=1202423408197 (The firm’s chairman explained that “90 percent ‘are being laid off because of the downturn in the real estate finance and securitization market.’ ”);
Noam Scheiber, The Last Days of Big Law: The Money Is Drying Up—and America’s Most
Storied Firms Are Terrified, NEW REPUBLIC (July 21, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/113941/big-law-firms-trouble-when-money-dries# (describing Mayer Brown’s contraction as its securitization work disappeared in the Great Recession). Some large firms
concentrated their practices more in these kinds of transactions while others had relatively
few, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to estimate the extent of this lost work to
larger firms overall. While it is possible that no new class of transactional work will arise
to replace the generation of toxic paper that lined many bankers’ and lawyers’ pockets in
the 1990s and 2000s, this Article does not assume that. Instead, it assumes that demand
for the kind of services BigLaw has traditionally provided will eventually return to levels
comparable to and ultimately exceeding those prevailing prior to the Great Recession. The
focus of the discussion in Part V.B, supra, was on changes not in demand for, but in the
staffing and pricing of, the legal services BigLaw has traditionally provided, with the prediction that those changes will result in a substantially reduced need for entry-level hires
in BigLaw over both the near and foreseeable term even as demand for legal services recovers. If no new Deal du Jour comes into vogue (as has typically occurred in the past as one
wave of fashionable transactions has crashed on the beach of dashed expectations while
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Broadening the perspective for a moment to the legal profession at
large, it would appear that most of the employment-suppressing phenomena just discussed arise out of the circumstances and business
model specific to BigLaw. Structural constraints on entry-level hiring
in other sectors of the legal employment market are more difficult to
identify. This suggests that the recent declines in sectors other than
BigLaw (including smaller private firms not structured on a BigLaw
model) may be predominantly cyclical, and could recover with the
economy, albeit slowly. The figures discussed above indicate that entry-level hiring in these other sectors is down only about 5% in the
aggregate since the recession began, so the recovery in legal hiring
outside BigLaw promises to be only modest as well as slow. 115
1. What Is Missing from the Arguments Favoring Cyclicality
The striking thing about the arguments favoring a cyclical view
of the downturn in BigLaw hiring is that most amount to the unelaborated assertion that this downturn will resolve itself in just the
same way that prior ones did, without any attention to the specific
circumstances that structural change advocates contend have materially rearranged themselves since last time, or any attempt either to
argue that these circumstances don’t exist or to explain why they
shouldn’t matter.
That is essentially true even of the most sophisticated analysis to
date, the study of the relative earning power of a law degree recently
published by Michael Simkovic and Frank McIntyre of Seton Hall
University. 116 Simkovic and McIntyre provide a detailed econometric
analysis of the enhanced earning power over the course of a career
that they believe can be attributed specifically to obtaining a law degree versus ending higher education with a bachelor’s degree. They
conclude that this lifetime earnings premium is quite substantial
across a surprisingly broad range of the workforce, remaining in the
low six figures over a lifetime (present value as of graduation, net of tax
effects and the cost of law school tuition) even at the 25th percentile.117
another rises behind it for the nation’s CEOs to paddle their boards out to ride, and yes
that pun was intended), demand for legal services will remain even more depressed.
115. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
116. Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 31-38. Professor Simkovic provides helpful
elaborations on the authors’ findings and answers to critics in, for example, Michael
Simkovic, Sample Size, Standard Errors, and Confidence Intervals, BRIAN LEITER’S L.
SCH. REPS. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/08/sample-sizestandard-errors-and-confidence-intervals.html [hereinafter Simkovic, Sample Size], and
Michael Simkovic, The Economic Value of a Law Degree: Correcting Misconceptions, BRIAN
LEITER’S L. SCH. REPS. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/08/theeconomic-value-of-a-law-degree-correcting-misconceptions.html#more.
117. See Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 22-23. The authors provide their
quantitative conclusions before taking tax and tuition into account, but appropriately note
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The paper has stirred a good deal of early attention and comment,
some of it raising thoughtful quantitative or methodological concerns,
and some venting regrettably superficial criticism or praise of the
piece as a betrayal or confirmation of deep-seated preexisting convictions. 118 Any sustained and fair-minded attention to the piece shows
it to be an intellectually energetic and honest attempt at a rigorous
quantitative analysis of a complex and difficult question. It deserves
serious engagement to explore both the reliability of the analysis and
the implications of the conclusions.
Unfortunately, an assessment of the details of this impressively
thoughtful effort is beyond the scope of this Article, with one exception: Simkovic and McIntyre predicate their conclusions about the
earning power of a law degree on a U.S. Census Bureau dataset of
earnings outcomes—the Survey of Income and Program Participation—from 1996 to 2011 (but not including anyone who graduated
after 2008). They assume these data establish “historic norms” that
are generalizable both back into the past preceding their study period
and, most significantly for current purposes, indefinitely into the future. 119 They make some effort to test this assumption, because they
recognize (quite correctly) that if changing circumstances are affecting JD vs. BA earnings materially differently than in the past, and
especially if any such differential continues, the predictive value of
their calculations based on past trends diminishes, and diminishes
more the greater the differences and the longer they last. 120 The authors examine the data available to them and conclude that earnings
differentials across the workforce for JDs versus B.A.s do not appear
to be fluctuating outside the recent historical ranges they examine.
“The most sober interpretation of the recent decline in starting salaries and employment for recent law graduates,” they conclude in a
finding of real potential relevance to the instant study, “is that it is
part of a broad cyclical downturn following the shock of the financial
crisis of 2007 to 2008 and the recession that followed. The historical
data still offers the best, most objective indicator of value.” 121
“That said,” they caution, “past performance does not guarantee
future returns.” 122 Indeed. In fact, the conclusion just quoted overthe necessity of doing so. The text above estimates those effects in estimating the premium.
118. See Paul L. Caron, TAXPROF BLOG, taxprof.typepad.com (last visited June 22,
2014) (search archives for the weeks of July 21 and July 28, 2013), collecting much of the
most interesting early commentary.
119. See Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 13 n.31 & 33 (“[L]ong-term historical
data remains a reasonable and appropriate data source to forecast future earnings premiums.”).
120. See id. at 31-32; see also Simkovic, Sample Size, supra note 116.
121. Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 38; see id. at 33-38 (analysis).
122. Id. at 38.
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states the authors’ real point: As they later concede, whether the recent declines in new lawyers’ employment and starting salary are cyclical is not nearly as pertinent to their conclusions as whether the
earnings differential between JDs and B.A.s is more or less stable
over time; after all, an ebbing tide may ground both JD and non-JD
boats.123 The conclusion the article states specifically regarding the
job market for new law graduates thus overreaches the authors’
actual analysis.
In short, with more sophistication and detail than most other
commentators who favor a cyclical view, Simkovic and McIntyre’s
argument for cyclicality in entry-level legal employment ultimately
boils down to the assertion that lawyer hiring and income have recovered after previous recessions, so they will this time too. Nothing
in the Simkovic and McIntyre study addresses the multiple factors
discussed in the preceding section that were falling into place as the
period they studied ended; and nothing explains why those factors
should not diminish lawyers’ employment and earning prospects,
both in absolute terms and relative to non-lawyers, both immediately
and in the longer term. 124 For the reasons just discussed, these struc123. Simkovic, Sample Size, supra note 116.
124. To be sure, this Article focuses specifically on entry-level hiring, which it is fair to
point out is only a narrow slice of an entire career, while Simkovic and McIntyre seek to
estimate the earnings premiums attributable to a law degree over an entire career. But
what we do know from historical data is that lawyers at large firms tend to make a good
deal more money at all levels of seniority than lawyers in other sectors do, and that lawyers move laterally between BigLaw firms or out of BigLaw altogether as their careers
advance much more frequently than they lateral into BigLaw from outside it. Galanter &
Henderson, supra note 108, at 1899-1904 & tbls. 2-4.
There are broader concerns as well. While a more detailed quantitative examination is beyond the scope of this Article and might confirm Simkovic and McIntyre’s predictions, it is worth investigating whether the specific period covered by their SIPP data (chosen, it should be stressed, because that is where the data are available, and not for any
obviously opportunistic reason) may prove to have been the lawyers’ “gilded age,” when the
earnings of a significant part of the workforce with JDs soared relative to non-JDs. And
that period may have ended, coincidentally, at the far edge of their dataset in 2008. If entry-level employment in BigLaw—by far the most lucrative sector of the workforce holding
JDs—has suddenly shrunk and stays smaller, see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying
text; if a greater number of new hires in BigLaw get smaller “staff” attorney salaries rather
than big partnership-track salaries and bonuses, see Anonymous Partner, BigLaw’s Unwritten Purpose, ABOVE THE L. (July 30, 2013, 10:11 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/
biglaws-unwritten-purpose-what-about-the-service-partners/#more-260730; if firms make
fewer new equity partners and “de-equitize” or dismiss existing ones, and pay larger numbers of longer-term employees less, see THOMAS S. CLAY & ERIC A. SEEGER, ALTMAN WEIL,
INC., 2010 LAW FIRMS IN TRANSITION 5, 11 (2010), available at http://www.altmanweil.com/
dir_images/upload/docs/2010LFiTSurvey.pdf; Claire Zillman, Law Firm Leaders Survey
2010: The New Normal, AM. LAW., Dec. 1, 2010, at 68; all while the rest of the job market
recovers cyclically as it historically has, there should be a compression in the JD earnings
premium going forward. If that proves to be true, there will still be an earnings premium
attributable to a law degree (no surprise there—it has always been true that many lawyers
make more money than many non-lawyers), but the premium will be smaller and make the
degree a “good investment” for fewer JD recipients than in the last fifteen to twenty years.
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tural trends indicate that entry-level BigLaw hiring is likely to remain depressed even as demand for the services that BigLaw firms
have traditionally provided returns to pre-recession levels.
In short, those arguing that current developments in BigLaw hiring are predominantly cyclical in origin leave the structural change
argument advanced here essentially unanswered. That doesn’t necessarily mean it is right, of course, but it does mean that if it’s wrong
we don’t know how or why.
2. How Profound Will the Influence of Any Structural Factors Be?
Of course, accepting a structural explanation of BigLaw hiring
changes does not tell us how much influence these structural factors
will exert in coming years on BigLaw hiring in particular, and on entry-level hiring overall. Time will tell, but early signs suggest that
the continuing effects may be more substantial than the most recent
increases in hiring might have augured.125 Observing that the number of lawyers with less than three years’ experience had dropped
30% in Am Law 100 firms between 2010 and 2012, American Lawyer
Media editor-in-chief Aric Press observed in April 2013 that “[t]he
most endangered species in The Am Law 100 appears to be the junior
associate.” 126 Soon afterward, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, a 1200lawyer, 21-office firm that is among the most profitable law firms in
America, laid off 7% of its associates and 110 staff, the first largescale BigLaw layoffs in some time. Its managing partner announced
the layoffs as “essential . . . to enable our firm to . . . retain its historic profitability in the new normal.” “If we thought this was a cycle
and our business was going to pick up meaningfully next year,” he
observed, “we would not be doing this.”127

There is some evidence that such a transformation could be underway. By 2013, 72% of
large-firm leaders (compared with 23% in 2009) believe that they can permanently expect
fewer equity partners in their firm structure than in prior periods. CLAY, supra note 109, at
2. Nearly half said their firms had “significantly” changed their partner admission or retention standards “to stay competitive in the post-recession economy”; 78% said their firms
had tightened partnership standards to some degree. Id. at 9, 18.
Nevertheless, as Professor Simkovic points out, “It would be a bad idea to extrapolate gloom or boom from a downward or upward trend in earnings using the last few years
of data. Trends, even when present, can stop or reverse themselves through dynamic labor
market responses or exogenous shocks.” Simkovic, Sample Size, supra note 116. As discussed below, if the legal academy and the number of JDs awarded shrinks going forward
as appears to be happening already, soon fewer JDs will be pursuing the same jobs, and
thus there is a good chance that more of the smaller number entering the profession will do
better, improving both entry-level employment and long-term earnings relative to non-JDs.
See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Figures 1–2, Part III.B.
126. Press, supra note 100.
127. Lattman, supra note 3.

596

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:541

Citibank, which lends to a broad range of larger law firms and
collects business data on them not accessible to the rest of us, commented in June 2013 that it saw many large firms as overstaffed on
the order of 10% and expected to see more BigLaw layoffs. 128 The
prediction proved all too accurate. 129 As of this writing, demand for
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Dimitra Kessenides, Big Law Still Needs to Get a Lot Smaller, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-13/big-lawstill-needs-to-get-a-lot-smaller (reporting layoffs at Fried, Frank); David Lat, Nationwide
Layoff Watch: 52 Lawyers and Staff Sent Packing, ABOVE THE L. (Apr. 7, 2014, 2:59 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/04/nationwide-layoff-watch-52-lawyers-and-staff-sent-packing
(52 associates and staff at Edwards Wildman & Palmer); David Lat, Nationwide Layoff
Watch: A Reorganization Claims More Jobs, ABOVE THE L. (Jan. 23, 2014, 3:18 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/01/nationwide-layoff-watch-a-reorganization-claims-more-jobs
/#more-297077 (elimination of 33 staff positions and relocation of 21 more at Bingham
McCutchen); David Lat, Nationwide Layoff Watch: Arent You Glad You Still Have a Job?,
ABOVE THE L. (Sept. 12, 2013, 10:16 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/09/nationwidelayoff-watch-arent-you-glad-you-still-have-a-job/#more-270667 (staff layoffs at Arent Fox);
David Lat, Nationwide Layoff Watch: Expelled Beyond the K&L Gates, ABOVE THE L. (Aug.
28, 2013, 1:51 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/08/nationwide-layoff-watch-expelledbeyond-the-kl-gates/# more-267591 (staff layoffs at K&L Gates); David Lat, Nationwide
Layoff Watch: Lateral Hiring Leading to Layoffs, ABOVE THE L. (Sept. 11, 2013, 11:15 AM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/09/nationwide-layoff-watch-lateral-hiring-leading-to-layoffs/#
more-270486 (staff layoffs at Duane Morris); David Lat, Nationwide Layoff Watch: More
About the Kasowitz Casualties, ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 21, 2014, 12:03 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/02/nationwide-layoff-watch-more-about-the-kasowitz-casualties/
#more-302984 (approximately 30 lawyers at all levels and staff at Kasowitz Benson); David
Lat, Nationwide Layoff Watch: Not Everyone’s A Winner, ABOVE THE L. (Apr. 14, 2014, 2:29
PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/04/nationwide-layoff-watch-not-everyones-a-winner/
#more-312433 (38 staff at Nixon Peabody); David Lat, Voluntary Buyouts Offered by Another Leading Law Firm, ABOVE THE L. (Sept. 12, 2013, 3:57 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/09/voluntary-buyouts-offered-by-another-leading-law-firm/#
more-270842 (staff buyouts at Schulte Roth & Zabel); Staci Zaretsky, Another ‘Storied’
Biglaw Firm Fails, Inciting Panic in the Legal Industry, ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 6, 2014, 11:51
AM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/02/another-storied-biglaw-firm-fails-inciting-panic-inthe-legal-industry/#more-299806 (500-lawyer Canadian firm Heenan Blaikie announces
dissolution); Staci Zaretsky, Nationwide Layoff Watch: A Double-Digit Jump (Apr. 11,
2014), ABOVE THE L., http://abovethelaw.com/2014/04/nationwide-layoff-watch-a-doubledigit-dump/#more-312220 (17 staff laid off at Downey Brand in light of 23 attorney departures since January 1); Staci Zaretsky, Nationwide Layoff Watch: Attorneys and Staffers
Never Again to See the Light Of Day, ABOVE THE L. (Aug. 9, 2013, 10:44 AM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/08/nationwide-layoff-watch-attorneys-and-staffers-never-againto-see-the-light-of-day/#more-263250 (layoffs and office closings at Jones Day, Goodwin
Proctor, Winston & Strawn, WilmerHale, Davis Polk, and Day Pitney); Staci Zaretsky,
Nationwide Layoff Watch: California Dreamin’ of Unemployment Benefits, ABOVE THE L.
(Sept. 26, 2013, 11:53 AM), (staff layoffs at Wilson Sonsini); Staci Zaretsky, Nationwide
Layoff Watch: Heads Continue to Roll in BigLaw, ABOVE THE L. (Oct. 7, 2013, 12:08 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/nationwide-layoff-watch-heads-continue-to-roll-in-biglaw/
#more-275774 (staff layoffs at Vedder Price); Staci Zaretsky, Nationwide Layoff Watch:
Law Firm Spreads Holiday Jeers, Trims Ranks Like Turkey, ABOVE THE L. (Nov. 7, 2013,
12:32 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/11/nationwide-layoff-watch-law-firm-spreadsholiday-jeers-trims-ranks-like-turkey/#more-282551 (staff layoffs at Fried Frank); Staci
Zaretsky, Nationwide Layoff Watch: Partners in Peril at Patton Boggs, ABOVE THE L. (Mar.
10, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/03/nationwide-layoff-watch-partners-inperil-at-patton-boggs/#more-306238 (“forced reductions” of 15 to 20 partners); Staci Zaretsky, Nationwide Layoff Watch: Ringing in the New Year With Unemployment Woes,
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BigLaw services remains slack, and price competition for those services between the biggest firms and less-large, lower-priced firms is
accelerating perceptibly, even as the broader economy may finally
be recovering.130
The sense that a good many things about BigLaw, including entrylevel hiring, have changed for the long haul is now approaching a
consensus among BigLaw managers. Large-firm summer programs,
an important indicator of perceived future hiring needs, are generally
one-third to one-half the size they were in 2007; most of these programs were even smaller in 2013 than they were in 2012. 131 Nearly
80% of the responding Am Law 200 managing partners surveyed in
2012 said they believed their next entering class of associates would

ABOVE THE L. (Jan. 23, 2014, 11:16 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/01/nationwide-layoffwatch-ringing-in-the-new-year-with-unemployment-woes/#more-296911 (25 staff at Husch
Blackwell); Staci Zaretsky, Nationwide Layoff Watch: Slimming Down for the Holidays,
ABOVE THE L. (Nov. 14, 2013, 4:24 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/11/nationwide-layoffwatch-patton-boggs-slims-down-for-the-holidays/#more-284078 (two rounds of attorney and
staff layoffs at Patton Boggs); Staci Zaretsky, Voluntary Buyout Watch: The Bloom Is Off
the Rose at This Firm, ABOVE THE L. (Nov. 15, 2013, 12:27 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/11/voluntary-buyout-watch-the-bloom-is-off-the-rose-at-thisfirm/#more-284215 (staff buyouts at Proskauer Rose and Katten Muchin); Staci Zaretsky,
Which Biglaw Firm Is Rescinding Offers?, ABOVE THE L. (Apr. 14, 2014, 12:52 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/04/which-biglaw-firm-is-rescinding-offers/ (10 of 23 new associates’ job offers rescinded by Brown Rudnick).
130. On slack demand, see supra notes 76, 129. As for price competition, surveys of
large-company general counsel indicate that they are increasingly turning away from the
super-premium priced, largest firms, and preferring the lower rates available at less-large
firms (200 to 500 lawyers) for a wide range of complex and substantial but not truly “betthe-company” work. The surveys report that the clients find they receive comparable quality and responsiveness for 30% less. Tom Huddleston Jr., Study Suggests Biggest Firms Are
Losing Market Share, AM. LAW. (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/
id=1202624726113/Study-Suggests-Biggest-Firms-Are-Losing-Market-Share; Dina Wang &
Firoz Dattu, Why Law Firm Pedigree May Be a Thing of the Past, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 11,
2013, 2:10 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/10/why-law-firm-pedigree-may-be-a-thing-of-thepast. On the improving state of the domestic economy, see National Income and Product
Accounts, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Mar. 27, 2014),
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/gdp4q13_3rd.htm (annualized U.S. GDP
growth of 4.1% in the third quarter and 2.6% in the fourth quarter of 2013).
131. Brian Dalton, More on the Decline of the Biglaw Summer Program, ABOVE THE L.
(Sept. 3, 2013, 4:40 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/09/more-on-the-decline-of-thebiglaw-summer-program/#more-268591 (broader survey of large firms shows reductions in
summer-program size of roughly 30% to 50% nationwide, with roughly 20% average reductions in New York); Sara Randazzo, Summer Hiring Survey: Big Firms Slimmed Down in
2013, AM. LAW. (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202614121454 (American Lawyer’s Summer Hiring Survey shows 2013 summer programs modestly smaller
than in 2012); The Chart That Should Make Everyone Doing On-Campus Interviewing
Absolutely Freaking Terrified, ABOVE THE L. (Aug. 29, 2013, 5:33 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/08/the-chart-that-should-make-everybody-doing-on-campusinterviewing-absolutely-freaking-terrified/#more-268014 (reporting that 84% of the AmLaw
50 reduced their summer-program headcounts dramatically between 2007 and 2013, by an
average of 46%).
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be the same size as or smaller than the current year’s. 132 The 2013
Altman Weil Law Firms in Transition survey 133 reported that 62% of
large-firm managers believe that smaller entering classes are a permanent phenomenon, compared with 11% in 2009. 134 Only slightly
more than half (53%) believed that they would have a greater absolute number of partnership-track associates in five years than they
do now, a startling prediction in a sector that has shown rapid
growth in both entry-level hiring and overall headcount consistently
for decades. 135 Seventy-six percent of firms (88% of firms over 250
lawyers) use contract lawyers, most of whom likely perform work
previously allocated to junior associates, and 75% of managers think
that more use of contract lawyers is a permanent future trend. 136
Seventy-nine percent anticipate greater competition from “nontraditional” service providers, the nature of which is not specified but
which presumably includes legal process outsourcers. 137
These responses are not offered out of any belief that BigLaw
managers are especially adept at anticipating or managing into the
future, especially in rapidly changing times. In fact, in the face of
widespread conviction that many essential features of their business
environment have permanently changed and that the pace of change
would accelerate going forward, 79% had a moderate or high degree
of confidence in their firms’ ability to “keep pace with the challenges
of the new legal marketplace” 138 despite the fact that substantial
numbers have not considered any significant changes to their business model. 139 But these are the gatekeepers of entry-level hiring,
132. Highlights from the 2012 Law Firm Leaders Survey, AM. LAW. (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202579458620&interactive=true&
slreturn=20130603171613.
133. CLAY, supra note 109. The survey was distributed to managing partners of nearly
800 firms of fifty or more lawyers; nearly 250 firms from across the range of firm sizes responded. Id. at 67.
134. Id. at 1, 2, 23.
135. Id. at 34; see supra Figure 4.
136. CLAY, supra note 109, at 26-28. Eighty-two percent of firms use part-time lawyers,
and 70.5% of managers believe that more part-time lawyers will be a permanent trend. Id.
137. Id. at 29. Firm managers generally think that the market for the services they
provide is going to keep getting tougher. Ninety percent of them (compared with 26% in
2009) think more of their work will be considered “commoditized” as time goes on, and 96%
of them (compared with 42% in 2009) anticipate greater price competition over the long
term. Id. at iv, 1-2. More than half of firms with over 250 lawyers reported that 31% to 40%
of their fees resulted from discounted rates, and over 11% of all responding firms discount
more than half their fees, apparently reflecting widespread price competition already underway. Id. at iv, 50. See also supra note 130, regarding intensifying price competition from
smaller large firms.
138. CLAY, supra note 109, at 4.
139. Specifically, 71% of firms have not made any significant strategic changes to their
pricing model, and over half have not made any significant strategic changes to their policies on partnership admission/retention or on efficiency of legal service delivery. Id. at 7-10.
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and it seems plausible to assume that they will act more consistently
with their expressed perceptions and staffing plans than not, at least
in the nearer term.
Given BigLaw’s disproportionate share of the contraction in entrylevel Law Jobs and its apparently disproportionate influence on such
hiring in other sectors of the legal market, these considerations provide little reason for optimism. Instead, they suggest that entry-level
hiring in BigLaw will remain depressed relative to its pre-2008 levels
for many years to come. They also suggest that any improvement will
significantly lag increases in demand for BigLaw’s services or growth
in BigLaw census overall. 140
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Given that law schools produce the new graduates that enter the
legal employment market, the market for legal education is closely
linked to the market for entry-level Law Jobs. If nothing else, the
preceding discussion shows that there are significantly more new law
graduates in recent years than there are entry-level Law Jobs. The
Law Jobs Ratio has fallen from its apogee in 2007 at between 70%
and 77% (depending on how JD Preferred placements are counted) to
between 54% and 63% in 2013. 141 At prevailing class sizes, that
amounts to roughly 20% fewer Law Jobs per graduate, or some 8000
additional new graduates per year today as compared with the years
preceding 2008 who are unable to obtain a Law Job within nine to
ten months of graduation.
A. Reduced Demand for Entry-Level Lawyers Prompts Reduced
Demand for Legal Education
While it seems to have taken a few years for this reality to have
been broadly internalized across the market for legal education, there
is little doubt that the growing drumbeat in the general-interest and
legal press eventually made the point: Prospective law students are
Moreover, 44% of these managing partners believe their partners have little awareness of
these challenges, and over half considered their partners’ “adaptability to change” to be
“low.” Id. at 5-6. The American Lawyer’s annual survey of AmLaw 200 managing partners
has exhibited similar levels of denial. Fifty-six percent of the responding managers in 2009
believed that the “economic downturn ha[d] produced a fundamental shift in the legal
marketplace,” but 70% of the same group said that the recession “ha[d] not produced
a similar shift in their own firm’s business model.” Drew Combs, Law Firm Leaders
Survey 2009, AM. LAW. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=
1202435711003.
140. The overall number of Law Jobs available is of course only one feature that is
critical in describing the entry-level Law Jobs market. The number of law graduates competing for those jobs is also essential, and will be discussed in Part VI-B.
141. See supra Figures 1–2. (Source: The annual NALP Jobs & JD’s Reports and ABA
employment outcomes data for the Classes of 2007–2012.)
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staying away in droves.142 The high-water mark for overall number of
applicants to accredited law schools was just over 100,000 in 2004.143
It has decreased, first gradually and then more rapidly, to an estimated 59,000 in the 2012–2013 applications cycle—a number that
has not been seen since Ronald Reagan was President, there were
175 accredited law schools (as compared with over 200 today), and
the median tuition for a private law school was about $7400 per year
(about $16,000 in 2013 dollars, as compared with a median private
school tuition of about $40,000 today).144 The overall number of applicants decreased by more than one-third between 2010 and 2013
alone. 145 The number of law school applicants in the current 2013–
2014 cycle, which in the past has proved roughly proportional to the
eventual total number of applicants in year-over-year comparisons, is
down another 8%.146
The largest aggregate entering law school class in history was the
class beginning in the fall of 2010, for which about 88,000 applicants
yielded a class of about 52,500. 147 The class entering in the fall of
142. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Law Schools’ Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs
Are Cut, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/education/lawschools-applications-fall-as-costs-rise-and-jobs-are-cut.html?smid=pl-share (“The drop in
applications is widely viewed as directly linked to perceptions of the declining job
market.”).
143. LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS: 2011 EDITION 874
(2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/120669429/Law-School-Applicant-Volume
[hereinafter ABA-LSAC 2011 OFFICIAL GUIDE].
144. ABA-Approved Law Schools, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools.html (last visited June 22, 2014) (202
ABA-accredited law schools in 2013, three provisionally); Dan Filler, Historical Data: Total
Number of Law Schools and Students, 1964–2012, FAC. LOUNGE (Feb. 2, 2013, 7:01 AM),
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/02/historical-data-total-number-of-law-students-19642012.html; Law-School Enrollment and Degrees Awarded, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444860104577558914050201888.html;
Projections for Law School Enrollments and Profiles for Fall 2013, LEGAL WHITEBOARD
(May 30, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/ 05/projections-forlaw-school-enrollments-and-profiles-for-fall-2013.html; Deborah Jones Merritt, Historic
Levels, INSIDE THE L. SCH. SCAM (Jan. 15, 2013, 10:18 PM), http://insidethelawschoolscam.
blogspot.com/2013/01/historic-levels.html; The median public law school tuition at that
time was about $1800 per year, about $3800 in today’s dollars, though the median today is
around $20,000. Merritt, supra.
145. See Bronner, supra note 142.
146. Alfred Brophy, LSAC Data and Predicting Number of Applicants for Fall 2014,
Part 17, FAC. LOUNGE (June 10, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/
06/lsac-data-and-predicting-number-of-applicants-for-fall-2014-part-17.html; Karen Sloan,
Big Slump for LSAT, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 4, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.law.com/
jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202626211107&thepage=1 (reporting that number of LSAT
takers for October 2013 administration was down 11% from prior year’s October administration); Three Year Applicant Volume Graphs, LSAC, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/
data/three-year-volume (last updated Mar. 21, 2014).
147. See Merritt, supra note 144 (including link to table of historical application and
matriculation figures).
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2012 was about 44,500, and the class entering in 2013 was under
40,000, the lowest aggregate enrollment since 1975 (when there were
almost 20% fewer accredited law schools), and a nearly 25% drop in
matriculating 1Ls since 2010.148 Half of the accredited law schools in
the United States reduced their first-year enrollment in 2012; 63% of
those surveyed said they did so because of the poor job market. 149
Two-thirds of accredited law schools cut their entering classes in
2013, 40% by 10% or more. 150 Between 2010 and 2013, 70% of all accredited law schools reduced the size of their entering classes by at
least 10%, 50% by at least 20%, 28% by at least 30%, and 14% by at
least 40%. 151
At one level, this reduces to the simple economic observation that
there is an oversupply of new law graduates relative to the Law Jobs
available for them. There does not seem to be any reason to believe
that this market will not adjust as markets usually do: In the face of
an excess supply of law graduates, demand and price for law degrees
should fall.
In fact, it is apparent that this correction is already underway.
Applications and enrollments are falling precipitously as just described. Apparently so is price. In addition to an increasing number
of tuition freezes and reductions, 152 there is evidence that many
148. ABA Section of Legal Education Reports 2013 Law School Enrollment Data, ABA
(Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2013/12/
aba_section_of_legal.html (aggregate class entering Fall 2013 was 39,675); Karen Sloan,
Nation’s Law Schools See Lowest Enrollment Since 1975, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 17, 2013,
11:29 AM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202633403462/Nation'sLaw-Schools-See-Lowest-Enrollment-Since-1975; Jennifer Smith, First-Year Law School
Enrollment at 1977 Levels, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2013, 1:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2013/12/17/first-year-law-school-enrollment-at-1977-levels/.
149. Kaplan Test Prep Survey: Facing a Tough Employment Landscape for New Lawyers,
Law Schools Cut the Size of Their Entering Classes and Revise Curriculum to Adapt to Evolving Market, KAPLAN TEST PREP (Nov. 19, 2012), http://press.kaptest.com/press-releases/
kaplan-test-prep-survey-facing-a-tough-employment-landscape-for-new-lawyers-law-schoolscut-the-size-of-their-entering-classes-and-revise-curriculum-to-adapt-to-evolving-market.
150. ABA Section of Legal Education Reports 2013 Law School Enrollment Data, supra
note 148; Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, In Rare Step, Law Schools Shrink Faculty, WALL
ST. J., July 16, 2013, at B1; Frank H. Wu, Shrinking Law Schools, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 3, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-h-wu/shrinking-lawschools_b_1934539.html (20% reduction in class size at UC Hastings in 2012 explained by
its dean); see also Bronner, supra note 142.
151. Jerry Organ, Thoughts on Fall 2013 Enrollment and Profile Data Among Law
Schools, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Mar. 2, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhite
board/2014/03/thoughts-on-fall-2013-enrollment-and-profile-data-among-law-schools.html.
152. See, e.g., Bronner, supra note 142 (University of Illinois); Dan Filler, Law School
Tuition Wars,
Ohio
Style,
FAC. LOUNGE
(Feb. 24,
2014,
6:11
AM),
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/02/law-tuition-wars-ohio-style.html (University of
Toledo cuts tuition for Ohio and Michigan residents 14%; Akron cuts nonresident tuition to
match resident tuition; Ohio Northern cuts tuition 26%; Cincinnati cuts nonresident tuition 30%); Dan Filler, Roger Williams Law Hires a Dean and Lowers Tuition, FAC. LOUNGE
(Jan. 16, 2014, 2:12 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/01/roger-williams-law-
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schools are engaging in price discrimination by selectively discounting tuition to more desirable applicants in the form of merit scholarships, especially at schools that are trying to maintain the strength of
their entering class statistics in order to maintain their U.S. News
rankings. 153 Nearly half of responding schools surveyed in 2012 reported they had increased the amount of financial aid available for
that year’s application cycle. 154 Widespread competition was reported
among law schools for students with average or better qualifications
during 2013.155
hires-a-dean-and-lowers-tuition.html (tuition cut 18%); Molly Greenberg, George Mason
Votes to Freeze Law Tuition Through 2016–17, INTHECAPITAL (Dec. 11, 2013, 5:28 PM),
http://inthecapital.streetwise.co/2013/12/11/george-mason-university-george-mason-votes-to
-freeze-law-tuition-through-2016-17 (Dean Dan Polsby explained, “One thing we understand is law and economics.”); Karen Sloan, Get Your Free Textbooks at the University of
Dayton, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202540970500/Getyour-free-textbooks-at-the-University-of-Dayton-; Karen Sloan, Movement to Lower Law
School Tuition Gains Steam, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.nationallaw
journal.com/id=1202644782051 (University of Tulsa and Thomas Jefferson); Karen Sloan,
Three Law Schools Freeze Tuition Rates, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.newyork
lawjournal.com/id=1202485767058/Three-Law-Schools-Freeze-Tuition-Rates?slreturn=201
40227215130 (Ave Maria, University of Maryland, and University of New Hampshire);
Karen Sloan, UMass Law Freezes Tuition for Three Years, NAT’L L.J. (June 22, 2012),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202560496984/UMass-Law-freezes-tuition
-for-three-years-; James B. Stewart, A Bold Bid to Combat a Crisis in Legal Education, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/business/ bold-bid-to-combat-acrisis-in-legal-education.html?_r=0; (tuition freeze in the coming year and 15% reduction
the year after at Brooklyn; 16% for resident and non-resident tuition at Iowa; 44% tuition
cut (to $25,000) with no merit scholarships at La Verne; $20,000 (50%) tuition reduction for
all Pennsylvania residents at Penn State); UCincy, Others Cuts Non-Resident Tuition,
NAT’L JURIST (July 12, 2013), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/ucincy-others-cutsnon-resident-tuition (University of Cincinnati, University of Arizona, and Seton Hall).
153. See, e.g., Dan Filler, Philadelphia Tuition Price War Escalates; Prices Drop, FAC.
LOUNGE (Jan. 22, 2014, 3:56 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/01/philadelphialaw-school-tuition-price-war-escalates-prices-drop.html (Villanova offers 100% merit scholarship to any student with a 157 LSAT and 3.6 UGPA); Elizabeth G. Olson, The Financial
Aid Arms Race at Law Schools, FORTUNE (Aug. 15, 2013, 10:16 AM), http://management.
fortune.cnn.com/2013/08/15/law-school-financial-aid-negotiation/; Karen Sloan, It’s a Buyers’ Market at Law School, NAT’L L.J. (June 25, 2012), http://www.nationallaw
journal.com/id=1202560485444/It’s-a-buyers’-market-at-law-school-.
154. See Kaplan Test Prep Survey, supra note 149. One law school sheepishly confessed
to overspending its financial aid budget by more than 100%, laying the blame for the excess on an admissions officer now under indictment for computer fraud. See Karen Sloan,
Louisville Blows Budget on Scholarships, NAT’L L.J. (July 18, 2012),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202563510746/Louisville-blows-budgeton-scholarships-; Andrew Wolfson, Ex-UL Law School Worker Charged in Scholarship Case,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.) (July 15, 2013, 6:10 PM), http://www.courier-journal.com/
proart/20130715/news01/307150084/ex-ul-law-school-worker-charged-in-scholarship-case?
odyssey=underbox%7Ctext%7Chome&pagerestricted=1.
155. “This year, the importance of financial aid got ratcheted up exponentially,” the
Georgetown Dean of Admissions told the Washington Post in September 2013. “The competition among the top schools is more ferocious because there are just fewer people in that
very top group of applicants. You had an arms race going on among top law schools so the
best applicants would seriously consider coming to your school.” Debra Cassens Weiss, DC
Law Schools Shrink, See Declining LSAT Scores; Are Rich Schools Winning the Financial-
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B. Reduced Class Sizes Should in Turn Strengthen the Market
for the Smaller Number of New Lawyers
It is worth pausing for a moment to appreciate the likely dynamic
between the market for new law students and the market for new
lawyers, not least because it offers a ray of hope in what otherwise
might seem a dismal landscape. If, as it appears is already occurring,
the legal academy significantly contracts, in just a few years there
will be substantially fewer law graduates seeking Law Jobs. Even if
the number of entry-level Law Jobs remains more or less flat, the
Law Jobs Ratio will significantly improve. In other words, with fewer
new lawyers chasing fewer Law Jobs, more graduates who want a
Law Job should be able to get one. In yet other words, the poor employment prospects for new law graduates today can be attributed as
much to an excess of law graduates as it can to a shortage of Law
Jobs. Though the number of Law Jobs may prove largely immovable,
the number of new law degrees is proving that it is not.
What this means is that while it currently appears that law school
is a very questionable gamble for all but those confident of a good finish at a strong school, the odds may be better in the future. The Class
of 2013 found (depending on how you count JD Preferred positions)
something over 25,000 Law Jobs. That was dreadful considering that
there were over 46,000 graduates, 156 but the latter number is falling.
Assuming that the contraction in the overall output of the legal academy continues as it has begun, the job prospects for those happy few
(or perhaps more accurately, happier fewer) beginning law school
three to five years from now should be brighter for those further from
the top of the class and not at the top-ranked schools.157
This observation has prompted the predictable overreaction from
law school promoters and apologists, some of whom have begun proAid War?, ABAJOURNAL (Sept. 16, 2013, 7:14 AM CDT) http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/dc_law_schools_shrink_see_declining_lsat_scores_are_rich_schools_winning_t
h/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email&utm_source=maestro&sc_cid=1309
18AK; see also sources cited supra note 152.
156. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 2012 LAW GRADUATE
EMPLOYMENT
DATA,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/reports/law_grad_employment
_data.authcheckdam.pdf.
157. This translates to an analogous observation regarding the earnings premium attributable to a law degree studied by Simkovic and McIntyre, discussed supra Part V.C.1:
To the extent law schools continue to produce an oversupply of new lawyers while Law
Jobs generally and the most lucrative Law Jobs in particular remain constricted, it seems
reasonable to predict that the earnings premium across the workforce will be compressed,
and law school will remain a dubious bet for larger numbers of potential applicants. If,
however, the legal education market corrects, a greater proportion of a smaller graduating
class should get better jobs, with the result that law-degree holders going forward will have
better earnings results overall, though the overall number of lawyers enjoying the benefit
will be smaller than before.
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claiming that “recent law school graduates and current and future
law students are standing at the threshold of the most robust legal
market that ever existed in this country—a legal market which will
grow, exist for, and coincide with, their entire professional career.” 158
As exhilarating as it would be to live in the best of all possible worlds
these oracles foretell, their conclusions seem doubtful for a variety
of reasons.
To begin with, there is real doubt when the legal academy’s output
will fall to something close to market-clearing levels for the entrylevel job market.159 Law schools have aggressively resisted shrinking
(or closing) in numbers proportional to the drop in the number of applicants: While the number of applicants has fallen about a third between the class entering law school in 2010 and the one entering in
2013, the 2013 aggregate entering class is still only 24% smaller than
2010’s, with even the groups of schools with generally weaker placement records shrinking on average less than the applicant pool. 160
Acceptance rates are climbing, and more recent graduates have entered law school with lower qualifications than their peers a few
years earlier. 161 How successfully the academy will continue to resist
158. René Reich-Graefe, Keep Calm and Carry On, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 66
(2014) (emphasis removed); see also Steven Freedman, #1 – Intro – Enroll Today!, FAC.
LOUNGE (Apr. 10, 2014, 10:08 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/04/1-intro-enrolltoday.html (“Why 2017-2018 Will Be a Fantastic Time to Graduate from Law School”); Ben
Barros, Answers to, and Questions for, Professor Tamanaha on Why Now Is a Great Time to
Go to Law School, FAC. LOUNGE (Apr. 15, 2014, 5:03 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/
2014/04/brian-tamanaha-has-asked-two-interesting-questions-in-response-to-steve-freedmans
-recent-posts-on-jobs-and-law-school-admi.html#more (“[T]he class of 2017 is virtually certain to graduate into the best job market in recent memory.”); Steven Freedman, #2 Supply
– How Many Law Students Will Graduate in 2017 & 2018?, FAC. LOUNGE (Apr. 10, 2014,
11:57 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/04/2-supply-how-many-law-students-willgraduate-in-2017-2018.html; Steven Freedman, #3 Scenarios: Supply/Demand by 20172018, FAC. LOUNGE (Apr. 15, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/04/3supplydemand-by-2017-2018-scenarios-.html.
159. Since this author posted the prediction of improving prospects for smaller future
graduating classes in the summer of 2013, more restrained and sober observers have
made more conservative predictions than those quoted above. See, e.g., Deborah J. Merritt,
When Will Graduates = Jobs?, LAW SCHOOL CAFÉ (Nov. 22, 2013, 8:40 PM),
http://www.lawschoolcafe.org/thread/when-will-graduates-jobs/ (predicting match between
graduates and jobs around 2021).
160. Schools ranked 100 or greater, or unranked, shrank on average 23% and 27% respectively; higher-ranked schools typically shrank less. Organ, supra note 151.
161. “The average decline in median LSAT scores between 2010 and 2013 across U.S.
News ‘tiers’ of law schools was 1.54 among top 50 schools, 2.27 among schools ranked 51-99,
2.11 among schools ranked 100-144, and 2.79 among schools ranked alphabetically.” Id.
Twenty percent of all accredited schools saw declines in median LSAT of four or more
points during that period. Id. “In 2010, there were 74 law schools with a median LSAT of
160; in 2013, that number has fallen to 56. At the other end of the spectrum, in 2010, there
were only 9 schools with a median LSAT of less than 150 and only one with a median
LSAT of 145. In 2013, the number of law schools with a median LSAT of less than 150 has
more than tripled to 32, while the number of law schools with a median LSAT of 145 or less
now numbers 9 (with the low now being a 143).” Id.
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shrinking, and how the employers will react to what may be perceived as the falling quality of the average graduate, are factors
whose effect is difficult to predict.162
Meanwhile, the economics of the profession and its costs of entry
have changed considerably for the worse. Adjusted for inflation, the
average starting salary for law school graduates has retreated to levels last seen in the mid-1980s, a time when law school tuition was
20%-40% of what it is today.163 Thus even with more Law Jobs per
graduate in prospect, a graduate’s likelihood of finding a job that
supports the cost of the degree has fallen significantly.
And none of these anticipated corrections seem likely to improve
the lot of the “Lost Generation” of JDs graduating between 2009 and
2014. Many of them entered law school at a time when almost no one
would have predicted the suddenness or severity of the Law-Job
market’s contraction, or that so many of them would find themselves
stranded on a mountain of student-loan debt while the winds of recession howled around them. Their inability to find legal work more
economically or professionally nourishing than occasional temporary
document review leaves them less and less likely to ever really practice law the longer their un- or under-employment continues. 164
Finally, whatever benefits these developments eventually deliver
will come at great cost. If the downsizing of the legal academy results
in better job prospects for future graduates, it will be a much smaller
population of such graduates who enjoy the benefit. And that benefit
will be achieved only at the expense of substantial downsizing at
many law schools, resulting in widespread staff and faculty job loss,
and quite probably outright closure of at least a few institutions.165
162. Brian Tamanaha has acutely observed that the promotional rhetoric may have its
own dynamic effects by encouraging greater number of applicants to attend law school
than the job market upon their graduation will bear. See Barros, supra note 158.
163. Merritt, supra note 144; see also Organ, supra note 10.
164. See Anonymous Recruitment Director, Anonymous Recruitment Director Answers
Your Email Questions (Part 1), ABOVE THE L. (Apr. 30, 2014, 3:28 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/04/anonymous-recruitment-director-answers-your-email-ques
tions-part-1/ (“A lawyer who is unemployed for two months is more employable to a prospective employer than a lawyer who has been unemployed for 14 months.”); cf. Annie
Lowrey, Caught in a Revolving Door of Unemployment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/business/caught-in-unemployments-revolving-door.
html?_r=0 (describing the increasing difficulty of obtaining employment the longer a worker remains unemployed); see also Caplan, supra note 5.
165. See, e.g., Paul Campos, 80% to 85% of ABA Law Schools Are Currently Losing
Money, LAWYERS, GUNS & MONEY (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/
2013/11/80-to-85-of-aba-law-schools-are-currently-losing-money; Paul Campos, Law School
Dean Threatens to Summarily Fire Faculty Who Don’t Accept Buyouts or Doubled Teaching
Loads, LAWYERS, GUNS & MONEY (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/
2013/10/law-school-dean-threatens-to-summarily-fire-faculty-who-dont-accept-buyouts-ordoubled-teaching-loads; Paul Campos, Thomas Jefferson School of Law Slashes Jobs,
Salaries,
and
Budget,
LAWYERS,
GUNS
&
MONEY
(Dec.
12,
2013),
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Such change may be necessary and even salutary, but no one should
underestimate the dislocation and loss that it will leave behind.
C. Questions for Further Inquiry
From one perspective, this simply means the pain experienced in
recent years by many law graduates is being pushed back onto the
institutions that produced those graduates, namely the law schools.
This raises the question how that pain will be distributed. While the
market for legal education appears to be correcting, the process is by
no means affecting all producers the same. Between 2010 and 2012,
the 15 top U.S. News-ranked schools reduced entering class size by
an average of 5%, while all ranked schools together reduced entering
class size by an average of 18%. 166 Tuition reductions also appear to
be concentrating outside the more prestigious law schools.167
All of that raises some serious and complex questions as we look
toward the future of the legal academy. One is the simple quantitative question of where all the contraction will come to rest: Where
will aggregate entering-class size bottom out? How will the shrinkage
be distributed across existing institutions? How many schools will be
forced to close their doors altogether?
More generally, we should be wondering which law schools are
likely to be more affected, or affected in different ways, by the pending market corrections; and what characteristics distinguish them
from those that will be less or differently affected. How are those institutions that are affected by growing market pressures going to react in the near term? How effective are those near-term reactions
likely to be, and how consistent will they be with a deeply considered
longer-term perspective?

http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2013/12/thomas-jefferson-school-of-law-slashes-jobssalaries-and-budget; Mark Glover, McGeorge Law School Downsizes Student Body and
Staff, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 5, 2013, 11:52 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/
2013/07/05/5547577/mcgeorge-law-school-downsizes.html; Dave Gram, Vt. Law School
Cutting Jobs, Preparing for Changes, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.boston.com/
news/education/2012/11/25/law-school-cutting-jobs-preparing-for-changes/QlBibvMJqGla0
P9FAuSEPI/story.html; Jones & Smith, supra note 150; David Lat, A Law School’s Possible Purge of its Junior Faculty Ranks, ABOVE THE L. (July 1, 2013, 4:05 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/a-law-schools-possible-purge-of-its-junior-faculty-ranks;
David Lat, Law School Rightsizing: This Is How You Do It, ABOVE THE L. (Oct. 7, 2013,
2:48 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/ 10/law-school-rightsizing-this-is-how-you-do-it.
166. Projections for Law School Enrollments and Profiles for Fall 2013, supra note 144.
167. See Matt Leichter, U.S. News Data Show 2011 May Be Beginning of End for Law
School Tuition Bubble, AM. LAW. (Mar. 19, 2012, 4:31 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
amlawdaily/2012/03/us-news-data-show-2011-may-be-beginning-of-end-for-law-school-tuitionbubble.html (suggesting that relentless tuition increases are generally slowing, especially
at “down-market law schools,” though not at the highest-ranked schools); see also supra
note 152.
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Another set of concerns was recently highlighted by the newly appointed dean of the NYU School of Law, who questioned “to what extent [elite law schools should] feel a need to respond to any of the
changing dynamics and challenges in the legal profession.”168
If individual institutions or the legal academy as a whole are
changing, what will they look like while they are changing, and what
will they look like when they are done? What innovations in the cost
and financing of legal education will emerge, and how will they be
distributed? How much will curriculum, staffing, and teaching methods be affected, and at which kinds of institutions?
We are seeing experimentation on a number of these fronts.
Which experiments will be judged successes remains to be seen, but
hazarding guesses and suggestions seems particularly appropriate
(albeit hazardous to one’s dignity) during this period of rapid change.
VII. CONCLUSION
While it is not easy to formulate a qualitative definition of the
kind of postgraduate placement for which law school should be considered a rational substantive preparation, this Article suggests one
focused on employment that someone would, ex ante, rationally plan
to attend law school to obtain or, put slightly differently, jobs for
which a law degree is either a condition of employment or provides
dramatic and substantial advantages in obtaining or performing the
job not more easily obtainable or substitutable (whether in nature or
extent) another way. It then attempts to measure the proportion of
each aggregate graduating law school class over the last thirty years
that obtained such “Law Jobs” within roughly nine months of graduation using the placement data accumulated by NALP and the ABA.
While imperfect, these measurements appear descriptive enough
to render some useful insights. One is that the best level of Law Jobs
placement that can reasonably be expected within nine months of
graduation in a very strong employment market has historically been
something approaching 80%. This yields the observation that there
have always been, and likely always will be, a significant number of
law school graduates who do not obtain genuinely law-related employment soon after entering the workforce.
These measurements also show that there has been a significant
contraction in the entry-level Law Jobs available to law school graduates since 2008, and that this contraction has been focused quite
disproportionately on the large-firm sector of the legal employment
168. Staci Zaretsky, Are Top Law School Grads Immune to Crushing Debt and Unemployment?, ABOVE THE L. (July 9, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/are-toplaw-school-grads-immune-to-crushing-debt-and-unemployment (quoting Trevor Morrison,
dean of NYU School of Law).
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market colloquially known as “BigLaw.” Analysis suggests that contractions in BigLaw hiring have not only been disproportionate in
number relative to the size of the entry-level market as a whole, but
also may disproportionately influence the prospects of entry-level jobseekers in other sectors of the Law-Job market.
These observations imply that future entry-level hiring in BigLaw
is likely to affect the job prospects of many future law graduates.
While some portion of the contraction in entry-level BigLaw hiring is
cyclically linked to the prevailing economic downturn, this portion is
likely modest, and the contraction is predominantly attributable to
structural changes in the way that complex, high-end legal services
are produced, staffed, and priced. These structural changes now appear to be well entrenched but still gathering in influence, with the
result that entry-level hiring in BigLaw, and by extension in the entry-level Law-Job market as a whole, is likely to remain depressed
below pre-recession levels for a considerable period of time, and also
likely to lag any increases in demand for BigLaw services or in
BigLaw census overall.
Finally, predicting an entry-level Law-Job market that remains
constricted well after the current recession recedes has important
implications for American law schools. The reduced demand for entry-level Law Jobs has already precipitated a rapid fall in the number of students considering law degrees and price competition among
some law schools for potential matriculants. At the same time, a substantial contraction in the legal academy of the kind apparently underway could ironically improve future graduates’ job prospects even
in a weak job market by reducing the number of new lawyers chasing
even a persistently limited number of Law Jobs. Notwithstanding
some observers’ optimism that this improvement will be profound
and immediate, it seems more likely that improving job prospects for
recent law graduates will develop more gradually over the next five
to ten years, will produce significantly fewer jobs that will support
the cost of a law degree than in prior years, and will be accompanied
by a shrinking profession and a shrinking academy.

